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his EAP begins 31 years of pub-
lication and includes “items of 
interest” and “citations re-
ceived.” We offer an “in memo-
riam” for space-syntax theorist Bill Hill-
ier, who died in London in November at 
the age of 82. Hillier’s work is essential for 
understanding and making robust places. 
    A major focus of this EAP issue is Goe-
thean science, as we include the fourth and 
final part of a 1999 conference presenta-
tion on Goethe’s way of understanding by 
the late philosopher Henri Bortoft. In this 
entry, Bortoft discusses the eye-opening 
work of biologist Wolfgang Schad, who 
uses Goethean method to understand the 
lived worlds of animals. Coincidentally, a 
new, expanded edition of Schad’s remark-
able Understanding Mammals has just 
been published, and we feature this work 
in a “book note” and commentary by ecol-
ogist Craig Holdrege. 
    In addition, we feature two “book notes” 
describing important work relating to Goe-
the’s phenomenology of color—first, an 
edited collection of writings by the late art-
ist and photographer Michael Wilson; sec-
ond, an exhibition catalogue, Experience 
Colour, edited by Goethean researcher 
Troy Vine and including hands-on demon-
strations of such color phenomena as after-
images, colored shadows, and prismatic 
colors—all key topics in Goethe’s 1810 
Theory of Color. 
    We also include a “book note” on soci-
ologist Michael Hviid Jacobsen’s En-
countering the Everyday: An Introduction 
to the Sociology of the Unnoticed; and es-
says by writer David Ferlic and anthropol-
ogist Kevin Browne.  We end with psy-
chologist Akihiro Yoshida’s Japanese 
translation of the “twenty-three definitions 
of phenomenology,” originally published 
in the 2019 summer/fall issue of EAP. 
Below: Drawings from Wolfgang Schad’s 
Understanding Mammals of the mountain 
or snow hare, in its summer coat, left; and 
winter coat, right. Schad writes: “Moun-
tain or snow hares (Lepus timidus) are no-
ticeably smaller than brown hares but 
larger than wild rabbits. They often sit up 
on their disproportionately large hind legs, 
and their ears are usually upright and 
alert. Whereas brown hares are often soli-
tary, mountain hares prefer to live in 
groups. Rather than hopping along, moun-
tain hares generally jump short distances, 
even when moving slowly. Nevertheless, 
they are not able to sprint as fast as brown 
hares. They dig short tunnels, but these are 
not as extensive as rabbit burrows. Moun-
tain hares are crepuscular (i.e., active at 
twilight) [and] seek nourishment in the 
early morning or late evening hours” 
(from Schad, vol. 2, pp. 928–29; drawings: 
P. Barruel and F. Murr). 
T 
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Items of interest 
The 12th-annual conference of the Archi-
tecture, Culture, and Spirituality Forum 
(ACSF) takes place at Frank Lloyd 
Wright’s Fallingwater in Bear Run, Penn-
sylvania, May 27–31, 2020. The confer-
ence theme is “Practices Toward a Future,” 
though papers and proposals relating to 
other topics are also considered. Keynote 
speakers are architectural historian Anat 
Geva, filmmaker Brent Green, and archi-
tectural theorist David Leatherbarrow. 
Established in 2007, ACSF provides an in-
ternational forum for scholarship, educa-
tion, practice, and advocacy regarding the 
cultural and spiritual significance of the 
built environment. The forum’s central as-
sumption is that design and experience of 
the built environment can assist the spir-
itual development of humanity in service 
of addressing the world’s most pressing is-
sues.  http://www.acsforum.org/symposium2020/. 
 
The Back to the Things Themselves! 
(BTTTT!) conference takes place at the 
University of Western Ontario in London, 
Ontario May 30–June 5, 2020. https://btttt.net/. 
 
The 57th annual International Making 
Cities Livable conference takes place in 
Carmel, Indiana, USA, June 2–6, 2020. 
The conference theme is “From Sprawl to 
Neighborhoods: Livable Cities and Sub-
urbs for All.” http://www.livablecities.org/. 
 
The 39th annual International Human 
Science Research conference (IHSR) will 
be held at New York City’s Pace College, 
June 12–15, 2020. The conference theme is 
“Building Bridges: State of the Science.” 
The central focus is the variety of theoreti-
cal and methodological approaches in phe-
nomenology and their impact on practical 
and conceptual understanding. The contact 
person is Dr. Eileen C. Engelke; 
eengelke@pace.edu. Additional information is 
available at the IHRS website: file:///C:/Us-
ers/seamon/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Win-
dows/INetCache/Content.Out-
look/QAXIZP4G/2019%20ISHR%20Newsletter.pdf 
. 
The annual conference of the Interdisci-
plinary Coalition of North American 
Phenomenologists (ICNAP) takes place 
June 11–13, 2020 at Pittsburgh’s Du-
quesne University. The conference theme 
is “Interdisciplinary Phenomenological 
Methodology.” Keynote speakers are phi-
losopher Dan Zahavi and psychologist 
Amedeo Giorgi. http://icnap.org/ 
 
The 59th annual meeting of the Society for 
Phenomenology and Existential Philoso-
phy (SPEP) will be held in Toronto, On-
tario, at the Hilton Toronto, October 8–10, 
2020. Papers from diverse philosophical 
perspectives in all areas of continental phi-
losophy are welcome. Meeting conjointly 
with SPEP are two other groups supporting 
phenomenological research: The Society 
for Phenomenology and the Human Sci-
ences (SPHS) and the International Asso-
ciation of Environmental Philosophy 
(IAEP). www.spep.org; www.sphs.info/; www.en-
vironmentalphilosophy.org/. 
 
Psychology of religion and 
place 
Editors Victor Counted and Fraser 
Watts have just published The Psy-
chology of Religion and Place: 
Emerging Perspectives (London: Pal-
grave Macmillan, 2019), a collection 
of 16 chapters examining the complex 
relationship between places, spiritual-
ity, and sacredness. Chapter titles in-
clude “Sacred Places: The Presence of 
the Past” (Rupert Sheldrake); “Reli-
gion, Place, and Attachment: An Eval-
uation of Conceptual Frameworks” 
(Victor Counted);  “Embodied Spirit-
uality Following Disaster: Exploring 
the Intersections of Religious and 
Place Attachment in Resilience and 
Meaning Making” (Laura E. Captari, 
Joshua N. Hook, Jamie D. Aten, Ed-
ward B. Davis, and Theresa Clement 
Tisdale); “Mapping the Visible and In-
visible Topographies of Place and 
Landscape through Sacred Mobilities” 
(Avril Maddrell);  “Glimpses of a 
Place Spirituality in American 
Filmmaker John Sayles’ Limbo: Au-
thenticity, Inauthenticity, and Modes of 
Place Engagement” (David Seamon); 
and “Religion, Well-being, and Thera-
peutic Landscape” (Boadi Agyekum). 
https://www.springer.com/us. 
 
Books on atmosphere 
In the last several years, the phenome-
non of atmosphere has become a prom-
inent topic in phenomenological and 
related research. Here, we provide a 
list of seven recent books on the topic. 
Two prominent figures in the field are 
German philosophers Gernot Böhme 
and Hermann Schmitz; note entries 
by these two thinkers in the list below. 
 
Gernot Böhme, 2017. The 
Aesthetics of Atmospheres 
(Jean-Paul Thibaud, ed.). 
London: Routledge. 
 
This German philosopher has played a 
major role in facilitating academic and 
professional interest in “atmosphere,” 
which he defines most simply as 
“tuned space.” This collection includes 
21 articles by Böhme published over 
the past 25 years and “maps out a huge 
range of questions, themes, and fields 
covered by the idea of atmosphere.” 
The articles are arranged thematically 
in four parts: “Theory: Aesthetics and 
aesthetical economy”; “Aesthetics of 
nature and art”; “Architecture”; and 
“Light and sound.” 
 
Gernot Böhme, 2019. At-
mospheric Architectures 
(A.-Chr. Engels-Schwarz-
paul, ed.). London: 
Bloomsbury. 
Volume editor and translator A.-Chr. 
Engels-Schwarzpaul explains in her in-
troduction that atmospheres as under-
stood by Böhme reflects “the relation-
ships of many elements in an enfolded, 
expansive space” and are “dynamic, 
diffused and pre- and inter-subjective, 
spatial carriers of mood and suffused 
with emotional power.” This volume is 
said to “bring together Böhme’s most 
seminal writings on the subject, 
through classic books and articles, 
many of which have hitherto only been 
available in German.” 
 
cont. next page → 
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Tonino Griffero and Giam-
piero Moretti, eds., 2018. 
Atmosphere/Atmospheres: 
Testing a New Paradigm. 
Milan: Mimesis Interna-
tional. 
 
This philosopher and comparative-lit-
erature scholar define atmosphere as “a 
sensorial and affective quality wide-
spread in space.” Their edited collec-
tion’s nine chapters examine the topic 
via a wide range of themes. Chapter ti-
tles include: “Atmospheres of and in 
Geography” (L. D’Allessandro, R. 
Sommella, and L. Viganoni); “Tech-
nosocial Atmospheres: Migration, In-
stitutional Racism, and Twitter” (A. 
Del Guercio, M. Anna Di Palma, and 
T. Terranova); “Economic Atmos-
pheres” (A. di Maio and S. Ercolano); 
“Something More: Atmospheres and 
Pathic Aesthetics” (T. Griffero); 
“Some Notes on Atmospheres and Fi-
nancial Markets” (A. Lopes and L. 
Gaeta); and “North American Atmos-
phere (Canada, Alaska, Greenland): 
Ecumene and Nordicity in Canada, Cli-
mate Change and Geostrategies in the 
Far and Extreme North” (R. G. 
Maury). This book is the third in the 
Mimesis series, “Atmospheric Spaces,” 
coordinated by Tonino Griffero. 
 
Tomino Griffero and Marco 
Tedeschini, 2019. Atmos-
phere and Aesthetics: A 
Plural Perspective. Cham, 
Switzerland: Springer. 
 
Chapters include Tonino Griffero’s 
“Is there such a Thing as an “Atmos-
pheric Turn”? Hermann Schmitz’s 
“Atmospheric Spaces”; Lorenzo 
Marinucci’s “Japanese Atmospheres”; 
Juhani Pallasmaa’s “The Atmos-
pheric Sense: Peripheral Perception 
and the Experience of Space”; David 
Seamon’s “Atmosphere, Place, and 
Phenomenology: Depictions of London 
Place Setting in Three Writings by 
British-African Novelist Doris Les-
sing”; Jean-Paul Thibaud’s “The 
Lesser Existence of Ambience”; and 
Michael Hauskeller and Tom Rice’s 
“The Atmospheric Design of Zoos.” 
Andreas Rauh, 2019. Con-
cerning Astonishing At-
mospheres. Milan: Mimesis 
International. 
 
“Atmospheres are omnipresent and 
they are frequently highlighted in eve-
ryday language. Yet, when do we per-
ceive atmospheres and how can we ex-
plore them? The concept of atmos-
phere extends aesthetics to aisthesis 
and conceives of perception as a rela-
tion bound to the present and with re-
gard to others. In this context, the 
astonishing atmosphere is identified as 
a watershed moment when the object 
of perception becomes the object of 
discourse.” 
 
Hermann Schmitz, 2019. 
New Phenomenology: A 
Brief Introduction (trans. 
Rudolf Own Müllan & intro-
duced by Tonino Griffero). 
Milan: Mimesis Interna-
tional. 
 
German philosopher Hermann 
Schmitz is the founder of a conceptual 
approach he has labelled the “new phe-
nomenology.” From the introduction: 
“Schmitz has developed his phenome-
nological insights in 20 volumes of 
writings, accompanied by 13 related 
books on the history of philosophy and 
the history of ideas.” The book in-
cludes discussion of “atmosphere,” 
which Schmitz defines as “the un-
bounded occupation of a surfaceless 
space in the region of what is experi-
enced as present.” 
 
Barbara Wolf, 2019. Atmos-
pheres of Learning. Milan: 
Mimesis International. 
 
“An atmosphere bears an effect wher-
ever it is perceptible by human beings, 
including situations in educational in-
stitutions. Due to their efficacious po-
tential, atmospheres can exude an in-
fluence that enhances or weakens, en-
courages or inhibits children in their 
development. This book considers var-
ious kinds of atmospheres that typi-
cally emerge in pedagogical contexts. 
Wolf suggests how atmospheres can be 
actively altered to improve learning.” 
 
Defining atmosphere 
Atmosphere is what relates objective 
factors and constellations of the envi-
ronment with my bodily feeling in that 
environment. This means: atmosphere 
is what is in between, what mediates 
the two sides… and can therefore be 
approached in two different ways: ei-
ther from a perception aesthetics or a 
production aesthetics viewpoint. 
    Atmospheres are quasi-objective, 
namely, they are out there; you can en-
ter an atmosphere, and you can be sur-
prisingly caught by an atmosphere. But 
on the other hand, atmospheres are not 
beings like things; they are nothing 
without a subject feeling them. They 
are subjective facts in the sense of Her-
mann Schmitz: to talk about atmos-
pheres, you must characterize them by 
the way they affect you. They tend to 
bring you into a certain mood and the 
way you name them is by the character 
of that mood. The atmosphere of a 
room may be oppressive, the atmos-
phere of a valley may be joyful. 
    But on the other side, you can argue 
about atmospheres, and you even can 
agree with others about what sort of at-
mosphere is present in a certain room 
or landscape. Thus atmospheres are 
quasi-objective or something existent 
intersubjectively. 
    But as mentioned, you can approach 
the phenomenon of atmospheres not 
only from the side of perception aes-
thetics but also from that of produc-
tions theory and practice of atmos-
pheres: you can learn from a stage de-
signer what means are necessary to 
produce a certain climate or atmos-
phere on the stage: what colors, ob-
jects, signs should be used, and in what 
way should the space of the stage itself 
be arranged. 
    The art of stage setting again proves 
that atmospheres are something quasi-
objective. Namely, if each member of 
the audience were to perceive the cli-
mate of the stage in a different way, 
the whole endeavor of stage setting 
would be useless (Böhme 2017, pp. 1–
2). 
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Citations received 
Erik Bormanis, 2019. Spaces 
of Belonging and the Precari-
ousness of Home. Puncta, 
vol. 2, no. 1, pp.19–32. 
 
This philosopher writes that “Personal 
ownership of one’s housing… is becoming 
a luxury and not a necessity and is becom-
ing increasingly unlikely… for those who 
do not have the means to afford down pay-
ments or finance mortgages on increas-
ingly inflated property prices. Such precar-
iousness… is precipitated and even made 
possible by a certain tacit (though some-
times overt) understanding of what hous-
ing is, specifically, the notion that housing 
is not a fundamental condition of human 
life related to our being “at home” in the 
world, but a commodity to be bought and 
sold on the free market, “real estate,” or, as 
is increasing common, a major financial 
“investment….  
“[I contend] this understanding of hous-
ing as commodity and investment is com-
plicit in creating a world where fewer and 
fewer people have adequate housing in the 
very concrete sense of having a shelter that 
will guarantee a minimal level of stability 
for the foreseeable future; furthermore, 
that the lack of such housing and the way 
its distribution is organized forecloses the 
more general possibility of feeling situated 
or ‘feeling at home’ in the world at all.” 
 
Alexis E. Gros, 2019. The Dy-
namization and Defamiliariza-
tion of the Lifeworld: Phe-
nomenological Reflections 
on the disorienting Effects of 
Social Acceleration. In R. 
Rizo Patrón de Lerner, ed., 
Methods and Problems: Cur-
rent Phenomenological Per-
spectives and Research. 
Lima Peru: Fondon Editorial 
PUCP. 
  
This social theorist draws partly on phe-
nomenologist Alfred Schutz’s work to 
consider today’s rapidity of societal 
change—”a progressive acceleration in the 
‘pace of life’.” He speaks of the “defamil-
iarization” of the taken-for-granted life-
world, including the breakdown of con-
stancy (people’s taken-for-granted as-
sumption that their lifeworlds will remain 
relatively stable over time) and shifts in 
typicality (the taken-for-granted ways in 
which people define and master lifeworld 
actions and needs). 
Gros argues that current feelings of dis-
orientation are propelled “by a process of 
defamiliarization of the lifeworld that fol-
lows from its relentless dynamization…. 
[I]ndividuals do not have enough time at 
their disposal for learning the skills needed 
for dealing with novel things, events, and 
situations that emerge every day…. Fur-
thermore, the fluidification of social 
groups, milieus, and institutions taking 
place in accelerating societies aggravate 
the problem, insofar as [this fluidification] 
destabilizes and undermines socialization 
processes.” 
 
Harry Francis Mallgrave, 
2018. From Object to Experi-
ence: The New Culture of Ar-
chitectural Design. London: 
Bloomsbury. 
 
Integrating architectural theory and recent 
developments in neuroscience, this archi-
tectural theorist emphasizes the “emotional 
and aesthetic responses” of design and “the 
sense of homeostatic wellbeing of those 
who will occupy any designed environ-
ment.” Includes a chapter on “the atmos-
phere of place.” 
 
Lynne Pearce, 2019. Mobility, 
Memory and the Lifecourse in 
Twentieth-Century Literature 
and Culture. London: Pal-
grave MacMillan. 
 
This scholar of literature examines how 
mobility contributes to interpersonal rela-
tionships, including courtship, bereave-
ment, and mid-age experiences. “How,” 
asks Pearce, “could there be relationships, 
if people did not come and go?” The author 
writes: “Working with autobiographical, 
non-fiction and literary texts from the 
twentieth century, [I investigate] the foun-
dational significance of mobility in inter-
personal relationships of various kinds, 
and at different stages of the lifecourse: 
this includes courtship (and its modern-day 
equivalents), marriage and other enduring 
relationships as well as the mobilities asso-
ciated with bereavement and loss.” 
 
Maria Francesca Piazzoni, 
2018. The Real Fake: Authen-
ticity and the Production of 
Space. NY: Fordham Univ. 
Press. 
 
This architect examines “how the users of 
Thames Town—an English-like village 
built in China’s Songjiang New Town near 
Shanghai—negotiate the notion of authen-
ticity through their everyday social and 
spatial practices.” Piazzoni argues that 
“authenticity underlies the social and phys-
ical production of space through both top-
down and bottom-up dynamics.” The au-
thor portrays Thames Town as “many 
places at once: a successful tourist destina-
tion, an affluent residential cluster, a city 
of migrant workers, and a ghost town.” She 
demonstrates how “people negotiate a 
sense of authenticity in an explicitly ‘fake 
environment” and suggests that “it is pre-
cisely the experience of ‘fakeness’ that al-
lows Thames Town’s users to develop a 
sense of place.” 
 
Edward Relph, 2020. Land-
scape as a Language without 
Words. In S. Brunn and R. 
Kehrein, eds., Handbook of 
the Changing World Lan-
guage Map. Cham, Switzer-
land: Springer. 
 
This geographer argues that “from the per-
spective of everyday experience, land-
scape is like a sign language that has to be 
constantly deciphered merely to find our 
way around. But the usual idea of land-
scape is that it is a backdrop to life that can 
be regarded or analyzed with detachment, 
and it is from this perspective that it has 
been argued that landscape can be read like 
a book that provides clues to history and 
culture.” 
    Relph “considers the idea that landscape 
is language and reviews suggestions by ge-
ographers and others about ways to read 
landscape and to understand its grammar. 
The idea of landscape has coincided with 
the so-called mechanical age of print and 
4
Environmental & Architectural Phenomenology, Vol. 31 [], No.
DOI:
 5 
rationalism that has prevailed for four cen-
turies and is now being displaced by elec-
tronic communications and social media 
that favor feeling and participation over 
contemplation and careful reading. A con-
sequence of this displacement is that the 
language of landscape is shifting from 
something that was once reasonably coher-
ent and decipherable to something that is 
increasingly heterotopic and constantly 
changing and requires new ways of under-
standing.” 
 
Kerstin Schmidt and Julia Is-
abel Faisst, 2018. Picturing 
America: Photography and 
the Sense of Place. Leiden, 
the Netherlands: Brill/Rodopi. 
 
The chapters in this edited volume aim to 
demonstrate that “photography is a preva-
lent practice of making American places. 
[These chapters] epitomize not only how 
pictures situate us in a specific place, but 
also how they create a sense of such muta-
ble place-worlds. Understanding photo-
graphs as prime sites of knowledge pro-
duction and advocates of socio-political 
transformations, a transnational set 
of scholars reveals how images enact both 
our perception and conception of Ameri-
can environments. They investigate the 
power photography yields in shaping our 
ideas of self, nation, and empire, of private 
and public space, through urban, land-
scape, wasteland, and portrait photog-
raphy.” 
  
Fredrik Svenaeus, 2019. A 
Defense of the Phenomeno-
logical Account of Health and 
Illness. Journal of Medicine 
and Philosophy, vol. 44, pp. 
459–478. 
 
Philosopher Fredrik Svenaeus is a major 
researcher in the “phenomenology of ill-
ness and health.” The latter he interprets as 
“a form of homelike, silent harmony that 
recedes to the background of a person's be-
ing-in-the-world,” whereas illness relates 
to “painful and obtrusive moods demand-
ing attention and making it hard or impos-
sible for the afflicted person to carry out 
everyday actions and projects.” 
     Svenaeus’ central argument is that 
“health is a homelike being-in-the-world in 
opposition to the unhomelikeness of ill-
ness.” In this article, he begins with a help-
ful overview of a phenomenology of health 
and illness (which he labels PHI) and then 
responds to two contrasting conceptual cri-
tiques: first, naturalistic criticism (the med-
icalization of health and illness); second, 
Nietzschean (the possibility that illness can 
in some cases make the sufferer a stronger 
and better person). 
 
Laura Tate and Brettany 
Shannon, eds., 2019. Plan-
ning for Authentic Cities. 
London: Routledge. 
 
These urban planners write that “in a world 
where change is unrelenting, people long 
for authentic places. This book examines 
the reasons for and responses to this long-
ing, considering the role of community de-
velopment in addressing community and 
neighborhood authenticity.” The eighteen 
chapters include Vikas Mehta’s “Neigh-
bourhood Authenticity and Sense of 
Place”; Na Matsumoto’s “Negotiating Di-
versity: The Transitioning Greektown of 
Baltimore City, Maryland”; and Leslie 
Shieh and Jessican Chaen’s “Chinatown, 
not Coffeetown: Authenticity and Place-
making in Vancouver’s Chinatown.” 
 
Roger Tyrrell, 2018. Aalto, 
Utzon, Fehn: Three Para-
digms of Phenomenological 
Architecture. London: 
Routledge. 
 
This architectural theorist draws on the 
work of three important Nordic archi-
tects—Alvar Aalto, Jorn Utzon, and Sverre 
Fehn—to consider aspects of architectural 
experience and to argue that one can find 
design commonalities in their work. 
 
James Wentling, 2017. De-
signing a Place Called Home. 
Cham, Switzerland: Springer. 
 
This British architect discusses a range of 
design possibilities whereby “we can build 
neighborhoods and communities where 
residents feel more connected to their 
homes and to one another.” The author re-
views “prototypical American housing de-
sign and then suggests ways to both learn 
from the past as well as adapt for new en-
vironmental imperatives, demographic 
changes, and lifestyle needs.” Chapter 
headings include “Housing yesterday,” 
“Housing today,” “Community planning 
and design,” “Siting and lot patterns,” 
“Floor plans and building image,” “Interior 
details,” “Exterior details,” “Multifamily 
housing,” “Manufactured housing,” and 
“Toward more sustainable homes and 
community.” 
 
Stephen Zavestoski and Jul-
ian Agyeman, eds., 2015. In-
complete Streets: Processes, 
Practices, and Possibilities. 
NY: Routledge. 
 
These16 chapters work to extend the con-
cept of “complete streets”—an urban-plan-
ning approach that moves away from an 
“auto-normative paradigm” to provide safe 
access and mobility to all users, including 
pedestrians and cyclists. Chapter titles in-
clude: “Urban Spatial Mobility in the Age 
of Sustainability” (Themis Chronopou-
los); “The Street as Ecology” (Vikas Me-
hta); “‘One Day the White People Are Go-
ing to Want These Houses Again’: Under-
standing Gentrification through the North 
Oakland Farmer’s Market” (Josh Cadji 
and Alison Hope Alkon); and “The Poli-
tics of Sustainability: Contested Urban 
Bikeway Development in Portland, Ore-
gon” (Thaddeus R. Miller and Amy Lu-
bitow). 
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In Memoriam: Bill Hillier (1937–2019) 
 
rchitectural theorist Bill Hill-
ier died in London on Novem-
ber 5, 2019, at the age of 82. 
Working with architect Ju-
lienne Hanson, Hillier developed a sig-
nificant environment-behavior theory 
known as space syntax, which demon-
strates that the spatial arrangement of 
pathways—whether roads, streets, side-
walks, building corridors, or other spaces 
of movement—play a major role in 
whether those pathways are well-used 
and animated or empty and lifeless. This 
theory was first laid out in Hillier and 
Hanson’s seminal The Social Logic of 
Space, published in 1984 and demonstrat-
ing convincingly that different pathway 
configurations can bring users together 
spatially or keep them apart. 
One crucial question for our time is un-
derstanding the ways in which the physi-
cal and spatial environment supports or 
stymies human life and wellbeing. Hill-
ier’s work is central for answering this 
question because he and Hanson actually 
located something real: the lived inti-
macy between pathway configuration and 
degree of users’ co-presence, co-aware-
ness, and co-encounter. 
 I only met Bill Hillier once, but I did 
have the pleasure of spending three days 
with him because we were both in Istan-
bul, Turkey, for the sixth international 
space syntax symposium held at the Istan-
bul Technological University. I was in-
vited to the conference as a keynote 
speaker, after which Hillier and I trav-
elled to Ankara to give a set of joint lec-
tures for the School of Architecture at 
Middle East Technical University. 
 Bill was one of the sharpest people I 
have ever met, and we had a series of 
arousing discussions on the phenomeno-
logical possibilities offered by his work. I 
remember Bill’s saying that few people 
really understood the promise of space 
syntax. Then, in his next sentence, I was 
flattered because he said, “David, you’re 
one of the few.” 
 I was flabbergasted and humbled be-
cause, here I was, the phenomenologist; 
and there he was, the analytic scientist. I 
felt honored that he would say what he 
said, but of course I admired him hugely 
for what he had been able to “see,” iden-
tify, and describe. As five of us were driv-
ing in a tiny car to visit Turkey’s “cave 
city” of Cappadocia, the topic of the title 
of Bill’s Space Is the Machine was men-
tioned. I said, “You really chose a poor ti-
tle for a remarkable book.” His wife 
Sheila laughed and quickly spoke up, 
“See, Bill, I told you it was a bad title. Fi-
nally, somebody’s telling the truth!” 
 Bill chuckled at our glee and explained 
that the book’s title was suggested by one 
of his graduate students as a means to 
highlight the spatial environment as the 
central engine of place robustness. 
Though I still think the book could have 
been better titled, I do believe that space 
syntax is one of the few real theories that 
has come out of the social and design sci-
ences in the last fifty years [1]. 
 Why do I say that? One central space-
syntax concept is axial space, which relates 
to the one-dimensional qualities of a path-
way and has bearing on human movement 
throughout a building, town, or city as a 
whole. Axial spaces are illustrated most 
perfectly by long narrow streets and are 
represented geometrically by the longest 
straight line that can be drawn through a 
street or other movement space before that 
line strikes a building, wall, or some other 
material object. 
 Axial lines are significant phenomeno-
logically for at least two reasons. First, be-
cause they indicate the farthest point of 
sight from where one happens to be, axial 
lines speak to the lived relationship be-
tween “here” and “there” and thus, at the 
settlement scale, have bearing on environ-
mental orientation and finding one’s way in 
a place. 
 Second, because they collectively delin-
eate the spatial system through which the 
various parts of a place are connected by 
pedestrian and vehicular circulation, a set-
tlement’s web of axial lines provides a sim-
plified rendition of the potential movement 
field of a place. Hillier’s important discov-
ery is that differently configured pathway 
webs play a major role in generating differ-
ent patterns of pathway movement and 
face-to-face encounter among pedestrians 
and other users. 
An important quantitative measure of 
axial spaces and pathway webs is 
integration, which Hillier defined as an 
index of the relative degree of 
connectedness that an axial space has in 
relation to all other axial spaces in a 
pathway system. The assumption is that a 
pathway connected to many other 
pathways will be more travelled because 
A 
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users will need to traverse that pathway to 
get to other pathways and destinations in 
the town or city. 
 Such a pathway is said to be strongly 
integrated in the movement field because 
many other pathways run into that well-
connected pathway and potentially 
provide a large pool of users. In contrast, 
a segregated pathway has few or no other 
pathways running into it—for example, a 
dead-end street. All other things being 
equal, a segregated pathway will be the 
locus of less movement, since it serves a 
more limited number of users in its 
immediate vicinity only [see London’s 
axial map, p. 9]. 
    Through integration and other 
quantitative measures, Hillier developed a 
compelling understanding of the global 
pattern of a place—in other words, the way 
the spatial configuration of a place’s 
pathway fabric as a whole lays out a 
potential movement field that gathers or 
separates co-presence. 
    Natural movement is the term Hillier 
used to describe the potential power of a 
pathway network to automatically stymie 
or facilitate movement and the face-to-face 
interactions of pedestrians and other place 
users. With many people present involved 
in their own regular routines and activities, 
the result typically is animated pathways 
and exuberant local places. Hillier 
recognized that other place elements like 
density, building types, and number, size, 
and range of functions and land uses also 
contribute to place vitality, but he argued 
that, ultimately, pathway configuration is 
most primary and most crucial (Hillier 
1996, p. 161). 
    In relation to cities, Hillier demonstrated 
that most urban pathway systems have 
traditionally been an integrated, 
interconnected fabric of variously-scaled 
deformed grids—pathway systems in 
which the most active, integrated streets 
make a shape that roughly suggests a wheel 
of rim, hub, and spokes. Typically, each of 
these deformed grids is associated with 
some designated neighborhood or 
district—for example, London’s Soho, 
West End, or City. 
    In turn, the integrated pathway structure 
of these districts conjoin to shape a much 
larger deformed grid that founds the 
movement dynamic of the city and London 
region as a whole. Hillier pointed out that 
twentieth-century urban design and 
planning regularly replaced integrated 
pathway configurations with treelike 
systems of segregated pathways that 
stymied or destroyed the intimate 
relationship between local and global 
integration and thereby eliminated much 
face-to-face interaction—for example, the 
“cul-de-sac and loop” pattern of low-
density, automobile-dependent suburbs or 
the hierarchical circulation layouts of many 
modernist housing estates. 
    From the perspective of a phenomenol-
ogy of place, what is striking about space 
syntax is that it offers a descriptive vehi-
cle for envisioning how the pathway net-
work of a place works to facilitate or in-
hibit movement patterns throughout that 
place. In spite of its objectivist frame-
work, space syntax gathers and holds to-
gether the parts of place that sustain tra-
versals within that place. 
    This integral togetherness is possible 
because understanding is grounded in the 
underlying topological constitution of the 
pathway structure as a whole—the way 
that a pathway is more or less enmeshed 
topologically in the place’s overall path-
way configuration and, thus, potentially, 
supports much or little human movement 
along that pathway. Each line of traversal, 
in other words, is not interpreted as a sep-
arate, disassociated pathway piece but as 
an integrated, continuous thread of the 
larger pathway fabric. As Hillier (2008, p. 
30) explained, “The configuration of the 
space network is, in and of itself, a pri-
mary shaper of the pattern of movement.”  
    The key phrase here is “in and of it-
self,” which intimates the inherent whole-
ness of the pathway structure. In this 
sense, space syntax offers a synergistic 
portrait of the potential pathway-move-
ment dynamic of a place, and this portrait 
arises, not analytically (from the summa-
tion of empirical movement data for each 
pathway) but synergistically from the 
very structure of the pathway configura-
tion itself as pictured quantitatively. Via 
measurement, space syntax provides a de-
scriptive means to identify and evaluate a 
web of continuous, intertwined pathways 
“that are themselves mutually defined 
only through the way in which they are 
gathered together within the place they 
also constitute” (Malpas, 2006, p. 29). 
    In terms of place making, space syntax is 
crucial because it demonstrates how one as-
pect of the designable environment—its 
spatial and topological features—plays a 
pivotal role in the movements of people-in-
place and therefore contributes to that 
place’s degree of “life” in terms of whether 
users are drawn together intercorporeally 
or kept apart. 
Space syntax offers a superlative exam-
ple of how environmental spatiality and 
materiality—though in one sense inert and 
passive—can actively contribute to making 
day-to-day human worlds one way rather 
than another. Hillier was able to demon-
strate conclusively that the physicality of 
place, via pathway structure, prearranges a 
spatial field, the nature of which has central 
bearing on the relative amount of human 
movement and co-presence in that place. 
    In Hillier’s memory, we reproduce por-
tions of his Space Is the Machine (Hillier, 
1996) and a chapter he wrote for an edited 
collection on urban design (Hillier, 2008). 
 
—David Seamon 
 
Note 
1. Portions of the following are drawn from Seamon 
2018, pp. 145–47. 
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The local structure of space 
The following passage is from Hill-
ier’s Space Is the Machine and incor-
porates what Hillier calls a “thought 
experiment” in which he hypotheti-
cally reconstructs the typical pedes-
trian experience for an individual X 
who lives on an ordinary London 
working-class street vs. another indi-
vidual Y who lives in a modernist 
housing estate on a short upper walk-
way remote from a public street. 
 
Imagine an individual, X, living on an 
ordinary London street. It is midday. 
7
Environmental & Architectural Phenomenology, Vol. 31 [], No.
ISSN: 1083-9194
 8 
 
X comes out of his or her front door. 
A stranger is about to pass by the 
door. Another is slightly farther away 
but will also pass the door shortly. A 
third is passing in the opposite direc-
tion on the other side of the street. 
In these circumstances, the presence 
of strangers seems natural. X even 
finds it reassuring. Certainly, X does 
not approach the person passing the 
door and ask what he or she is doing 
here. If X did this, others would think 
X’s behavior odd, even threatening. 
Unless there were special circum-
stances, someone might even send for 
the police if X persisted. 
    Now consider Y, who lives on a 
short upper-level walkway remote 
from the public street within a Lon-
don housing estate. Like X, Y comes 
out of his or her front door and looks 
down the walkway. Suddenly a 
stranger appears round the corner in 
exactly the same position relative to 
Y’s doorway as in the previous case 
the stranger was to X’s. 
    Due to the local structure of the 
space [marked by much shorter path-
ways and thus minimal visual contact 
with the estate’s larger pathway net-
work] …, it is likely no one else is 
present. Unlike X, Y is nervous and 
probably does one of two things: ei-
ther Y goes back inside the dwelling, 
if that is easier, or if not asks the 
stranger if he is lost. The encounter is 
tense. Both parties are nervous. Y is 
being “territorial,” defending local 
space, and the stranger is being asked 
for his “credentials.” 
    Now the curious thing is that in the 
prevailing spatial circumstances, Y’s 
behavior, which, if it had occurred on 
X’s street, would have seemed bi-
zarre, seems normal, even virtuous. In 
different environmental conditions, it 
seems, not only do we find different 
behaviors but different legitimizations 
of behavior. What is expected in one 
circumstance is read as bizarre in an-
other.  
    So what exactly has changed? 
There seem to be two possibilities. 
First, the overall characteristics of the 
spatial configuration… has 
changed…. Second, Y’s expectation 
of the presence of people has 
changed. 
    These two changes are strictly re-
lated to each other. Changes in spatial 
configuration produce, quite system-
atically, different natural patterns of 
presence and co-presence of people. 
People know this and make inferences 
about people from the configuration 
of the environment. An environment’s 
configuration therefore creates a pat-
tern of normal expectation about peo-
ple. These expectations guide our be-
havior. Where they are violated, we 
are uncomfortable and behave accord-
ingly. What is environmentally nor-
mal in one circumstance is unex-
pected in another…. 
    The behavioral difference we have 
noted is therefore environmentally in-
duced, not directly, but via the rela-
tion between configurational facts and 
configuration expectations. 
    One effect of this is that it can in-
duce environmental fear, often to a 
greater degree than is justified by the 
facts of crime, because it takes the 
form of an inference from environ-
ment rather than from an actual pres-
ence of people. 
    It is these inferences from the struc-
ture of space to the pattern of proba-
ble co-presence that influence behav-
ior and are also responsible for the 
high levels of fear that prevail in 
many housing estates. This is the fun-
damental reason that the urban nor-
mality of street-based systems usually 
seems relatively safer than most hous-
ing estates (Hillier 1996, pp. 190–91). 
 
local vs. global 
The current preoccupation with ‘place’ 
seems no more than the most recent 
version of the urban designer’s prefer-
ence for the local and apparently tracta-
ble at the expense of the global and in-
tractable in cities…. Places are not lo-
cal things. They are moments in large-
scale things, the large-scale things we 
call cities. Places do not make cities. It 
is cities that make places. The distinc-
tion is vital. We cannot make places 
without understanding cities (Hillier 
1996, p. 151). 
A fundamental urban relation 
Why should the network of space pre-
occupy us to the point where we seek 
to make it the centerpiece of theory? 
The answer is that syntactic studies of 
cities as networks of space have, in 
recent years, brought to light a funda-
mental link between the form of cities 
and their functioning, one which af-
fects our whole approach to the city: 
the configuration of the space net-
work is, in and of itself, a primary 
shaper of the pattern of movement. 
    This is not simply a technical ob-
servation. In shaping movement, 
space also shapes the pattern of hu-
man copresence—and of course coab-
sence—that seem to be the key to our 
sense that good cities are human and 
social, as well as physical, things. 
This effect arises not from the proper-
ties of the individual spaces, or even 
from the local connections, but from 
the whole configuration of the net-
work at a nonlocal scale. 
    The implication is that the large-
scale architecture of the urban spatial 
network, which has been neglected 
for decades by both research and 
practice, matters more than we 
thought to the life of the city and how 
it comes into existence. 
    The idea is, of course, not really 
new. Most designers believe that we 
can manipulate space to create emer-
gent human patterns, although there 
are conflicting views on how this can 
and should be done. What is new is 
the idea that this is a scientific propo-
sition. 
    The idea does not feature signifi-
cantly, for example, in most engineer-
ing-based movement models, where 
movement is seen as a matter of at-
traction: locations attract movement 
according to the “mass” of their at-
tractions, such as the shopping floor 
area, and the space network is the 
means of getting there. The models 
work by analogy with a Newtonian 
physical system, and this is where the 
core idea of attraction comes from. As 
with planetary bodies, attraction is 
seen as proportionate to the combined 
“mass” of areas and inverse to some 
definition of distance. 
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    Such models can of course be made 
to work, but they can never be true 
theoretical models because attraction 
is not primary. The space network, by 
shaping movement, also shapes the 
pattern of attractors, since attractor 
activities like retail follow the pat-
terns of movement already created by 
the network. 
    So, if we want a theoretical under-
standing of the city we should not 
start with the distribution of attrac-
tion, since this is in good part an 
emergent product of the network. The 
shift to a network view of the city, as 
implied by space syntax, is then also a 
paradigm change. It puts the phenom-
ena of the city into a different order. 
    Once we understand the relation 
between the network configuration 
and movement, we can begin to see 
how cities come to be as they are and 
how they work. In particular, we can 
begin to understand why and how cit-
ies, if they are allowed to, tend to self-
organize into a polycentric pattern, by 
creating a network of linked centers 
and subcenters, at all scales, from a 
couple of shops and a cafe to whole 
sub-cities, all set into a background of 
residential space. 
    This is the nature of the organic 
city, which evolves over tens or hun-
dreds of years to form the seamless 
web of busy and quiet places, with 
everything seeming to be in the right 
place. So what we are talking about 
here is a theory of the self-evolving 
city. A key element in this is that the 
process by which cities create them-
selves is about the relation between 
scales: that how local places arise in 
cities depends as much on how they 
are embedded in their larger-scale 
context as in their intrinsic properties 
(Hillier 2008, pp. 30–31). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Above: Axial map of central London. In this mapping generated quantitatively by numerical integration values, the reddest lines repre-
sent the most integrated pathways and thus the streets of most pedestrian movement. The long red line running almost horizontally from 
central left is Oxford Street, said to be one of the world’s most heavily used streets by pedestrians. Note the yellow, orange, and red 
lines form rough “deformed wheels” indicating important London neighborhoods like Soho or The City. In turn, these smaller “wheels” 
weave themselves into a larger city web that allows for a great degree of permeability and ease of movement with and between neigh-
borhoods and districts. The blue and indigo lines indicate pathways much less integrated into London’s pathway system and thus streets 
of much less movement. Map image © Space Syntax Limited and used with permission. 
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Book Note 
Michael Hviid Jacobsen, ed. Encountering the Everyday: An Introduction to the Sociologies 
of the Unnoticed. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
 
he 16 chapters of this edited 
collection aim to offer “a clear, 
contemporary and comprehen-
sive overview of the sociologies 
of everyday life.” The entries are ar-
ranged in three parts, the first of which fo-
cuses on foundational traditions that in-
clude the Chicago school and human 
ecology, American pragmaticism, phe-
nomenology, symbolic interactionism, 
existential sociology, and critical every-
day life sociologies. 
Chapters in the second part deal with 
more recent points of view, including 
French sociologies of the everyday, Erv-
ing Goffman, and ethnomethodology. 
The last part focuses on recent develop-
ments including the sociology of emo-
tions, social semiotics, cultural studies, 
and interpretive interactionism. 
Jacobson concludes that “what makes 
everyday life so difficult to capture is that 
it is or seems to be everywhere. As an em-
porium of experiences, everyday life is 
universally available, although it is not 
necessarily the same type of everyday life 
experienced by different people at differ-
ent times and different places. It is also 
ineradicable… and therefore inescapa-
ble. Thus, as experience, we cannot es-
cape the everyday… because the every-
day equals what phenomenologists call 
the “paramount reality,” a reality we al-
ways eventually return to… (p. 15). 
In his introductory chapter, Jacobsen 
defines “the everyday” in several differ-
ent ways, drawing on articulations from 
sociologists Norbert Elias, Mike Feath-
erstone, and Andrew J. Weigert. These 
descriptions are provided in the following 
sidebars. 
                                                           
Everyday & non-everyday 
Norbert Elias’s inventory of the eve-
ryday via contrast with the “non-eve-
ryday” (1998): 
▪ The everyday as opposed to holi-
day. 
▪ Everyday = routine as opposed to 
extraordinary areas of society not 
subject to routine. 
▪ Everyday = the working day as 
opposed to the bourgeois sphere, 
that is people living on profits 
and luxury, without really work-
ing. 
▪ Everyday = the life of the masses 
as opposed to the life of the privi-
leged and powerful. 
▪ Everyday = the sphere of mun-
dane events as opposed to every-
thing regarded by traditional po-
litical historiography as the only 
relevant or “great” events in his-
tory. 
▪ Everyday = private life (family, 
love, children) as opposed to pub-
lic or occupational life. 
▪ Everyday = the sphere of natural, 
spontaneous, unreflecting, genu-
ine experience and thinking as 
opposed to the sphere of reflec-
tive, artificial, unspontaneous, es-
pecially scientific experience and 
thinking. 
▪ Everyday = ideological, naïve, 
superficial and false experience 
and thinking as opposed to cor-
rect, genuine, and true experience 
and thinking. 
                                                                             
Recurring day-to-day patterns 
Mike Featherstone’s list of frequently 
recurring features of everyday life 
(1992): 
▪ An emphasis on what happens 
every day—the routine, repeti-
tive, taken-for-granted experi-
ences, beliefs, and practices. 
▪ An emphasis on the sphere of re-
productions and maintenance, the 
pre-institutional zone of basic ac-
tivities, predominantly carried out 
by women. 
▪ An emphasis on the present 
providing a non-reflexive sense 
of immersion in the immediacy 
of current experiences and activi-
ties. 
▪ An emphasis on the non-individ-
ual embodied sense of being to-
gether in spontaneous common 
activities outside, or in the inter-
stices, of the official institutional 
domains. 
▪ An emphasis on heterogeneous 
knowledge over rationality and 
the linearity of writing. 
 
Three lived levels 
Andrew J. Weigert’s three interrelated 
levels of human existence and biog-
raphy (1981): 
▪ The daily routines of our patterns 
of thoughts, words and deeds. 
▪ The social structures and social 
beliefs that normalize and legiti-
mate some actions and routines 
and deem others abnormal and il-
legitimate. 
▪ The underlying assumptions and 
basic principles of any human 
life. 
T 
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Book Note 
Michael H. Wilson, 2018. What Is Colour? The Collected Works. Laura Liska and Troy Vine, 
eds. Berlin: Logos Verlag. 
 
ichael H. Wilson (1901–
1985) was an artist and 
photographer who, in 
1949, published What is 
Colour? The Goethean Approach to a 
Fundamental Problem. Over time, this 
study became a highly regarded introduc-
tion to color, which marked Wilson’s key 
interest for the rest of his life. As the edi-
tors of this comprehensive set of his writ-
ings explain: 
 
This question [What is color?] stayed 
with Wilson for the rest of his life. He pur-
sued it from multiple perspectives begin-
ning with the physiological aspect of 
color and progressing to the physical, 
philosophical, artistic, therapeutic and 
lastly spiritual aspects… Goethe’s The-
ory of Colours is by far the most cited 
work in Wilson’s writings on colour, and 
an important aspect of his lifelong occu-
pation with the topic was to develop an 
understanding of Goethe’s colour re-
search and its relevance for science, the 
arts, therapy, and spirituality. His early 
research on colour arose out of his inter-
est as an artist and photographer… The 
second phase of Wilson’s research began 
when he joined the Physical Society Col-
our Group and started working with 
physicists in the field of colour science. 
This resulted in a series of publications—
many in leading physics journals…. Later 
in life, Wilson extended the implications 
of this research into the fields of art, ther-
apy and spirituality…. (p. xvii-xviii). 
 
This collection of Wilson’s writings in-
cludes 27 entries and demonstrates the 
profound impact that Goethe’s way of 
thinking and seeing had on Wilson’s 
work. In the sidebar, below, we present 
his lucid explication of the nub of Goe-
thean science in which the central aim is 
to see the phenomenon in its wholeness. 
                                                                                 
Goethean science vs. conven-
tional scientific method 
In the remarkable essay, “The Experi-
ment as Mediator between Object and 
Subject,” which he wrote in 1793 [see 
p. 13], Goethe describes, gently and 
with great modesty, the principles that 
he believes should apply to any work 
of scientific investigation. First and 
foremost is the quality we now call 
objectivity. The pleasure or pain, at-
traction or repulsion, the use or harm 
that in the first place relate human be-
ings to the things of nature, must be 
allowed no influence on their judge-
ment…. 
    Objectivity, meticulous judgement, 
rigorous procedure, exchange of ideas 
and disclosure of results—these be-
long to any standards to the best pre-
cepts of scientific method. Where, 
then, does Goethe’s method differ, 
and why should it have been so com-
pletely neglected, even denied, by all 
the scientists of fame who followed 
him? 
    The success of the scientific 
method that had begun with Galileo 
two centuries earlier was that the phe-
nomena of nature, particularly those 
of the inorganic world, were begin-
ning to be described in terms of rela-
tionships of number and measure—re-
lationships that could be expressed as 
natural law, accessible to reason, and 
independent of authority. Movements 
of bodies—falling, rolling, swinging, 
rotating—could be expressed and pre-
dicted in terms of distance, time and 
mass. Musical sounds were found to 
have measurable vibrations as their 
basis, expansion and contraction be-
came a relationship of temperature, 
pressure, and volume. Colours be-
came measurable components of 
white light, and so on. 
    These claims could be verified by 
experiment, and experimenting was 
open to anyone…. What could be 
more natural than to conclude that 
here was the kind of thinking that 
would unlock the secrets of the world, 
and what more tempting than to want 
to take nature to pieces down to the 
very last cog? 
    For Goethe, this attitude had no at-
traction. He had his own kind of ac-
quaintance with Nature. He, too, saw 
that all the elements of nature are re-
lated, but he saw it in a different way. 
For him, nature was a unity, a oneness 
in which everything had its place. He 
did not look for the smallest unit out 
of which everything else was built up, 
but for the way in which everything 
was related to the highest, the ulti-
mate all-embracing unity. 
    He saw moreover that the only way 
in which human beings can compre-
hend this unity is by first separating, 
differentiating, defining. Separating is 
the work of the intellect, whereas re-
assembling is the work of the intelli-
gence, the reason. 
    The realization of this last point 
leads us to the heart of the matter. The 
discovery that we can take nature to 
pieces and find the most wonderful 
and beautiful relationships and pro-
portions between the various parts is 
no evidence at all that the completed 
works of creation were put together 
from the elementary parts in the first 
place. In the world of living things, 
M 
11
Environmental & Architectural Phenomenology, Vol. 31 [], No.
ISSN: 1083-9194
 12 
 
we have only to follow the successive 
stages from seed to flower, from egg 
to chicken, to see that the reverse is 
indeed the case. Nature proceeds by 
processes of differentiation and selec-
tion. It is only human beings who 
must construct from the parts to the 
whole…. 
    As earthly beings, we are so consti-
tuted that anything we create out of 
our own forces cannot be translated 
from idea to reality without going the 
stage of being “broken down” into el-
ements of manageable size. It is the 
same with our knowledge. We first 
break down the vast natural events 
into separate processes, principles, 
and definitions that have been suffi-
ciently “abstracted” for our intellect to 
be able to grasp them…. 
    The almost universal failure, 
against which Goethe protested with 
such vehemence, has been the value 
to recognize that it is we who have 
made the separate pieces, whereas in 
nature everything is part of the unity, 
the totality. 
    We have broken nature into pieces, 
and have then pretended that the 
pieces, as pieces, had been there all 
the time. All the single concepts that 
constitute our scientific language, 
such as distance, time, mass, tempera-
ture, wavelength, frequency and the 
like, are concepts that we have created 
to be able to describe and to predict 
with accuracy the behavior of the 
things around us. And now we have 
got into the habit of talking about the 
world as if it really had been built up 
from these separate elements. … 
    For Goethe, it appeared highly un-
scientific and quite unforgivable to 
pretend to “explain” something that 
one could see and experience, by 
means of something that one could 
not experience. The idea that behind 
the curtain of our often unreliable 
sense impressions lies the “reality” of 
the objective mechanical processes 
that can be measured and calculated, 
was foreign and repulsive to him. 
    His method was to use all his 
senses and all his presence of mind to 
observe, in patience and humility, the 
things he was interested in and from 
the things themselves to learn the kind 
of thinking appropriate to the study of 
them. He would experiment, observe, 
and modify the experiment into all 
possible forms and variations to per-
ceive the kind of relationship that ex-
isted between the various elements of 
the phenomenon. 
    He would never forget that the ex-
periment itself was his own deliberate 
creation, and not nature’s deed at all. 
He would find out which conditions 
were essential to the appearance of 
the phenomenon and which could be 
discarded. The relationships were cer-
tainly not arbitrary. They originated in 
the things themselves even though 
they had to be formulated in terms of 
human though and speech. 
    Therefore, if he arranged before his 
mind’s eye all possible instances of 
the same phenomenon, it should even-
tually be possible for the essential na-
ture of the phenomenon, the very ker-
nel of it, to present itself to his con-
sciousness. 
    The form in which he experienced 
this he called the “Urphenomenon.” It 
was an almost direct inner perception, 
which he called “higher experience.” 
His Urphenomenon was the same 
thing that the intellect would formu-
late as a law of Nature; but by refrain-
ing from making this formulation, and 
by allowing the Urphenomenon to 
speak for itself, he avoided the danger 
of arbitrarily importing a type of 
thinking, a theory that might not be in 
conformity with the nature of the phe-
nomenon itself (Wilson, “Goethean-
ism and the Scientific Method,” pp. 
203–06; originally 1955). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michael Wilson, Two views in Skye. Watercolors, 1943:“The major theme in his life had been the understanding of light and colour… 
He developed a remarkably keen eye for observing and recording the ever-changing patterns and effects of sky and cloud, sunbeam 
and shadow, dawn and dust, and all the phenomena of the atmosphere…. His knowledge of clouds was put to a more intimate test 
when he took up gliding in the fifties. From his home in Clent he would look out to the westward every morning, where the ridge of the 
Longmynd can just be seen on the distant horizon, and he would read the sky to see whether it would be a good day for riding the ther-
mals. If it was…, he would take his camera and soon be soaring on the air-currents….” (R. Brocklebank, “Epilogue,” p. 295). 
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Book Note 
Troy Vine, ed., 2018. Experience Colour. Stroud, UK: Ruskin Mill Land 
Trust/Field Center [exhibits by Nora Löbe and Matthias Rang]. 
 
 
ponsored by England’s Ruskin 
Mill Trust and Field Center, this 
exquisitely envisioned volume 
catalogues an exhibition of Goe-
the’s 1810 color theory (Farbenlehre) 
originally prepared for its 2010 bicenten-
nial by recreating many of the color, light, 
and darkness phenomena described by 
Goethe. The original exhibition text was 
in German, for which editor Troy Vine 
has provided English translation. He has 
also added several essays by English con-
tributors as well as several essays 
“deal[ing] with topics that have so far 
only appeared in German.” 
Most broadly, the volume is organized 
around three themes: “Exploring colour”; 
“Understanding colour”; and “Applying 
colour.” The volume begins with over 60 
exhibition entries, all superbly accompa-
nied by explanatory text, drawings, and 
photographs. These items are followed by 
longer essays on Goethe’s color theory, 
including Goethe’s seminal statement of 
method, “Experiment as Mediator be-
tween Object and Subject.” Other entries 
include “Goethe’s Farbenlehre from the 
Perspective of Modern Physics” 
(Johannes Grebe-Ellis and Ol-
iver Passon); “Farbenlehre and 
Goethe’s Nonromantic Imagi-
nation” (Dennis L. Sepper); 
“Goethe’s Polemic as Therapy” 
(Troy Vine); and “A Model for 
Scientific Research? A Consid-
eration of Goethe’s Approach to 
Colour Science” (Johannes 
Kühl and Matthias Rang). 
This catalogue is a major con-
tribution to phenomenological 
method, convincingly illustrat-
ing how a phenomenology of 
the natural world—in this case 
the phenomena of light, dark-
ness, and color—might proceed.                                                                         
Experience vs. idea 
The fact is that man delights more in 
the idea than in the thing, or rather, he 
only delights in the thing in so far as 
he presents it to his mind in an idea. It 
must somehow fit into his sense, his 
way of thinking. And he may lift his 
way of thought ever so far above the 
common level, he may purify it as he 
will; still, as a rule it is but an effort to 
bring a multiplicity of objects into 
some palpable relation, which is not 
strictly speaking theirs among them-
selves. Hence the prevailing tendency 
to form hypotheses and theories, ter-
minologies and systems…. 
    Every experience, therefore, every 
experiment as such, is by its nature to 
be looked upon as isolated fact, and 
yet withal the power of the human 
mind strives overwhelmingly to unite 
and to connect whatever is outside it 
and within its ken. This being so, we 
can appreciate the danger we incur 
when we desire to connect a single 
experience with an idea already 
formed, or by single experiments to 
prove some relationship which is not 
merely a matter of bare fact but has 
already received, in its expression, the 
form and impress of the mind. 
     By such endeavours, theories and 
systems commonly arise, which no 
doubt do credit to their authors’ skill, 
but which if praised unduly or sus-
tained to long quickly begin to hinder 
and to mar the progress of the human 
spirit which in some sense they as-
sisted…. 
    A man so well deserving will not 
lack worshippers and pupils who will 
acquaint themselves with history and 
system, loudly admiring and to the 
best of their ability making the mas-
ter’s way of thought their own. Some-
times a doctrine of this kind will gain 
the upper hand to such an extent that 
if you are bold enough to doubt it, 
you are held impudent and wanton. 
Then only later centuries will at last 
venture to approach the sanctuary, 
claiming the object of research once 
more for common sense, using a 
lighter touch, till they repeat of the 
founder of a learned sect what a wit 
once remarked of a great scientist: he 
would have been a great man if he 
had only invented less! …. 
    In living Nature, nothing happens 
that is not united with the whole. 
Granted that our experiences only ap-
pear to us as isolated facts and that 
the same applies to our experiments, 
this does not mean that they are in 
Nature isolated. The question only is, 
how do we find the real connection of 
these phenomena or these events? 
(Goethe, “Experiment as Mediator be-
tween Object and Subject,” p. 130 in 
Vine; originally 1793. 
 
 
 
 
 
           
 
                                        
S 
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Light’s invisibility 
These two photographs, right, illus-
trate an exhibit demonstrating the “In-
visibility of Light”: “A beam of light, 
directed upward, remains invisible 
until a hand or another object is 
placed in its path. Light illuminates 
the object and enables us to see it. 
Light is itself invisible, but it makes 
objects visible. We could say that 
light enables sight. 
    “Inside the cylinder it is dark 
(right). When you place your hand in-
side, it is illuminated by light from 
below (far right). Without the pres-
ence of an object, you cannot tell 
whether the light is on or off.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Right: Photographs of hands-on demon-
strations at the 2018 “Experience Col-
our” exhibition, held in Stourbridge, UK. 
Visitors could “discover the science of 
colour, find out how different colours af-
fect us, and experience the power of col-
our.” Exhibits “investigated some of the 
most unexpected colour phenomena that 
still intrigue physicists today, colour ap-
pearances that deeply move us, and the 
effect of colour in our lives.” The exhibi-
tion included color demonstrations based 
on the work of artist and photographer 
Michael Wilson [see pp 11–12].  
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Book Note 
Wolfgang Schad, 2019. Understanding Mammals, 2 vols. Mark Riegner, ed. Harlemville, NY: 
Adonis Press. 
 
s EAP editor, I have consist-
ently included work relating 
to Goethe’s way of science, 
which can be understood as a 
phenomenology of nature that offers one 
valuable means for fostering an openness 
toward the living presence of the natural 
world, including its animals. In part four 
of his essay on Goethean science [this is-
sue, pp. 18-21], philosopher Henri 
Bortoft makes considerable reference to 
the remarkable Goethean research on 
mammals conducted by German biologist 
Wolfgang Schad. Originally published in 
English in 1977 as one volume entitled 
Man and Mammals, Schad’s study has re-
cently been extended and updated as two 
beautifully illustrated volumes now enti-
tled Understanding Mammals and care-
fully edited by ecologist Mark Riegner. 
    Schad’s aim in these two volumes is to 
render a Goethean phenomenology of 
mammals through qualities of animal 
form, appearance, and behavior. In the 
holistic biology that Schad presents, each 
feature of an animal is seen as significant 
because the whole is reflected in each 
part. The aim is to recognize the inner or-
ganic order in an animal in such a way 
that its individual features can be ex-
plained by the basic organization of the 
animal itself (Bortoft 1996, pp. 89–99). 
Schad’s interpretations offer stunning in-
sights into the experiences and worlds of 
creatures other than ourselves. 
    One of the most intriguing results of 
Understanding Mammals is its returning 
to questions we asked as children but for 
which we never received satisfactory an-
swers: For example, what exactly is a cat? 
What exactly is a dog? How are cats and 
dogs different and how are they alike? 
Why are leopards spotted but zebras 
stripped? Why are giraffes’ necks long? 
Why do cows have horns but deer antlers? 
Why do beavers, otters, seals, and hippo-
potami live in water?  
    For contributing to a lived environmen-
tal ethic, Schad’s work is important be-
cause it provides an organized, accessible 
way for us as human beings to move 
closer to the worlds of other creatures. In 
this growing intimacy, we not only 
deepen our intellectual understanding of 
animals but also strengthen our empathy 
and emotional sense. We better realize the 
profound moral implications of Goethe’s 
claim that each animal is “a small world, 
existing for its own sake, by its own 
means. Every creature has its reason to 
be” (Goethe 1988, p. 121). 
    Here, we reprint Schad’s account of re-
discovering “joy” in understanding ani-
mals and his interpretation of cats vs. 
dogs, a topic with which he introduces his 
chapter on “terrestrial carnivores.” We 
then reprint ecologist Craig Holdrege’s 
commentary on Schad’s work, first pub-
lished in In Context, the newsletter of 
Holdredge’s Nature Institute in upstate 
New York. 
—David Seamon  
References 
    Bortoft, H., 1996. The Wholeness of Nature: 
Goethe’s Science of Conscious Participation in 
Nature. Hudson, NY: Lindesfarne Press. 
    Goethe, J. W. von, 1988. Goethe: Scientific 
Studies D. Miller, ed. and trans.). NY: Suhrkamp. 
    Holdrege, C., 1998. Seeing the Animal Whole, in 
Seamon & Zajonc [see below], pp. 213–32. 
    Riegner, M., 1998. Horns, Hooves, Spots, and 
Stripes in Seamon & Zajonc [see below], pp. 213–
32. 
    Schad, W., 1977. Man and Mammals: Toward a 
Biology of Form. Garden City, NY: Waldorf Press. 
    Seamon, D. & A. Zajonc, eds., 1998. Goethe’s 
Way of Science: A Phenomenology of Nature. 
Albany, NY: SUNY Press. 
 
“Recapturing the child’s joy” 
How much of the all-too-familiar 
world have we missed because we 
have not paid enough attention to it? 
In the end, we need both: delight in 
details and interest in the overall im-
pression that comes to expression 
through them. Our goal is to recapture 
the child’s joy in each phenomenon… 
    Only when we deepen our percep-
tions in this way shall we once again 
be attracted to a weasel or a fox, a 
seal or a dolphin, as we rediscover 
their singular way of being (Schad, p. 
47). 
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Cats and Dogs 
The carnivores most familiar to us are 
the domestic dog (family Canidae) 
and cat (family Felidae). These two 
animals were tamed in ancient times: 
the dog from the wolf (Canis lupus) 
of the Near East even before 10,000 
BC, and the cat from the Egyptian de-
sert cat (Felis silvestris lybica) around 
1,500 BC or earlier. 
    The cat’s senses of sight and hear-
ing are remarkable. The long whiskers 
on its upper lip and above its eyes 
give further indication of its delicate 
sensitivity. The dog, in contrast, has 
developed one of the more typically 
duller senses, that of smell. 
    The cat’s sensitive constitution is 
also revealed in its paws, with their 
retractile claws, so different from the 
dog, whose limbs have become tools 
for running, with immovable claws. 
    The dog is not even strictly carniv-
orous; it finds a mixed, omnivorous 
diet most acceptable. If given only 
meat, it sometimes buries the bones to 
obtain a food that has decomposed 
and become richer in bacteria. 
    The wolf, too, tends to eat carrion, 
and both wolves and foxes, and espe-
cially coyotes, occasionally eat ber-
ries to supplement their otherwise all-
meat diet. 
    All this is disdained by the cat. 
With the exception of milk, its taste 
runs to pure meat, rich in blood. Even 
its method of hunting is in keeping 
with its strongly developed senses: it 
prowls stealthily, then crouches mo-
tionless, with all its senses focused on 
its prey, and finally pounces with 
lightning speed. By contrast, wolves, 
as well as their descendants, the dogs, 
hunt by pursuit. Tirelessly, they drive 
their victim until it is exhausted and 
must surrender. 
    Cats hunt primarily with their 
senses, thus avoiding great physical 
exertion; dogs hunt with their limbs, 
powerfully activating their metabo-
lism. Dogs and cats have thus devel-
oped polar modes within the “attack” 
behavior typical of all carnivores. 
    As any cat owner knows, cats are 
“individualists.” The European wild-
cat, for example, is not only shy to-
ward human beings; it also avoids 
other animals in the woods. A house 
cat’s attachment to its house is often 
greater than its bond with its human 
companions. 
   Clearly, dogs are more dependent, 
more “loyal” and good-natured, and 
are often kept by people as a substi-
tute for human companionship. Dogs 
inherited this instinct for life-long at-
tachment precisely from their wolf 
ancestors, which live in the strong 
community of the pack. 
   Dogs can redirect this instinct to-
ward their human masters, while cats, 
having inherited no comparable in-
stinct, cannot. Anyone who has 
owned both these animals can easily 
recognize the constitutional difference 
between them: Cats manifest primar-
ily the nerve-sensing organization; 
dogs, metabolic-limb processes. And 
yet in their supple agility, well-pro-
portioned form, and moderate size, 
both are typical carnivores, shaped 
primarily by the rhythmic system. 
    In addition to the wildcat, we also 
find in Europe, and in North America, 
the lynx, a larger cat with a brush of 
elongated hairs on the tips of its ears, 
side whiskers, a rather short tail, and 
long, powerful limbs. The lynx often 
covers great distances in a short time; 
it also makes use of its limbs when 
capturing prey. In this animal, there-
fore, the feline type slightly ap-
proaches the canine form. 
    Among the dog-like animals, in 
contrast, we find a smaller form, the 
red fox, as well as other fox species, 
such as the New World gray fox, with 
its disproportionately short legs and 
long tail; these animals generally stalk 
their prey or lie in wait for it, thus 
representing a sense-oriented form 
among the canids. Foxes can climb 
trees, albeit with more difficulty than 
cats, and, as in cats, their pupils are 
slit-shaped. Thus the basic contrast 
we have discovered between the 
sense-active cats and the metaboli-
cally-oriented dogs also exists even 
within the European members of each 
of these groups. 
    The red fox, compared with other 
European canines, has rather feline 
characteristics, while the lynx is al-
most dog-like among cats. Even so, 
the lynx, Europe’s largest cat, remains 
smaller than the wolf. Correspond-
ingly, the red fox, the smallest of the 
European canines, is larger than the 
wildcat. This fact is quite significant 
for the biology of form, for … size is 
dependent upon the relationship be-
tween sensory and metabolic systems. 
Thus, … the very size of the different 
animals is indicative of the order in-
herent within the multiplicity of na-
ture (Schad, pp.48–49). 
 
 
Above: The contrasting placement of 
horns for the rhinoceros, wart hog, and 
bison. Note the bison’s horns are at the 
top of the head, whereas the wart hog’s 
horns are close to the mouth. In his ani-
mal studies, Goethe came to realize that 
the appearances of horns and other head 
protuberances were always related to 
the absence of certain teeth from the ani-
mal’s upper jaw. In his work, Schad ex-
amines this relationship in exhaustive 
detail (drawing from Schad, p. 362).  
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A World of Dynamic Connections 
A Commentary on Wolfgang Schad’s Understanding Mammals 
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nderstanding Mammals is 
the fruit of biologist Wolf-
gang Schad's many decades 
of research into the dynamic 
morphology of mammals. I’ve met many 
people whose eyes were opened by 
Schad’s work to a fundamentally new and 
exciting way of understanding the forms 
and characteristics of mammals. This was 
also the case for me. Moreover, he has in-
spired other researchers and helped them 
discover patterns in different groups of 
animals. 
The first edition of Säugetier und 
Mensch was published in 1971, when 
Schad was 36 years old. An English trans-
lation, entitled Man and Mammals, was 
published in 1977. For many years, the 
work has been out of print and eagerly 
sought after as a rare used book. But 
Schad never stopped researching, and his 
ability to hold innumerable facts and then 
weave them into a meaningful, coherent 
picture is truly remarkable. In 2012, the 
new German edition was published—two 
volumes totaling 1300 pages! Truly, a 
lifetime achievement. 
Now, through the tireless efforts of 
publisher John Barnes and editor Mark 
Riegner, we have an English translation 
that includes new material (Schad re-
mains an indefatigable researcher at 83!) 
and many new illustrations. In the scope 
of its treatment of mammals and in the 
uniqueness of approach, the book is 
bound to become a classic. 
Animal form is usually interpreted 
through a Darwinian (or better said, Neo-
Darwinian) view of evolution. All charac-
teristics, whether the color or patterning 
of the fur or the form of the teeth, are con-
sidered in terms of survival. How do the 
long neck of the giraffe, the flat tail of the 
beaver, the larger molars of a horse, or the 
horns of an antelope allow the animal to 
survive? The beaver’s teeth are good for 
gnawing wood, the large flat tail for 
swimming and as a paddle to slap against 
the water to alert other beavers about the 
presence of potential predators, and the 
high-set eye sockets for swimming incon-
spicuously with its head only slight above 
the water surface. 
In a way, all these “explanations” make 
sense. But they are also quite speculative. 
Moreover, this way of looking leads us to 
mentally dissect the animal into different 
traits, each of which has its own type of 
survival value. The coherence and integ-
rity of an animal dissolves into a collec-
tion of traits, and all its characteristics are 
considered solely as adaptations that se-
cure survival. 
Already long before Darwin, Goethe 
protested against trying to explain animal 
traits in terms of their utilitarian func-
tions. He wrote, “we conceive the indi-
vidual animal as a small world, existing 
for its own sake, by its own means. Every 
creature is its own reason to be… We will 
not claim that a bull has been given horns 
so that he can butt; instead, we will try to 
discover how he might have developed 
the horns he uses for butting.” This means 
that we need to study the characteristics 
of an animal in relation to one another and 
see if we can discover how they fit to-
gether with the context of the animal as a 
whole. 
In this spirit, Wolfgang Schad studies 
animals. From childhood onward, Schad 
was a keen observer of animals. When he 
later studied Rudolf Steiner’s ideas of 
threefoldness in human being…, he 
formed a mental lens that allowed him to 
see patterns in animals that had hardly 
been recognized before. With this lens, he 
has been able to build up a comprehensive 
picture of the diversity of mammals. 
A threefold pattern in mammals is per-
haps most vividly displayed in the differ-
ences between rodents, carnivores, and 
hoofed mammals (ungulates). Of course, 
there are many other groups of mammals, 
and Schad shows how the lens of three-
foldness can help makes sense of some of 
this variety. Moreover, one can see recur-
ring themes within the different groups 
that otherwise remain unappreciated. 
Schad is not interested in fitting the di-
versity of mammals into a neat, rigid sys-
tem. Rather, he explores what kinds of re-
lations the lens of threefoldness allows 
one to see. And many notable and surpris-
ing connections show themselves in the 
1300 pages of the two volumes. Few read-
ers will study the entire book page by 
page. But once you work enough with the 
book to gain a good sense of what Schad 
means by threefoldness, you can begin to 
see and appreciate the nuanced iterations 
in different groups. You begin to move in 
a world of dynamic connections. Then 
you can select individual chapters about, 
say, bats or whales, and not only learn in-
teresting details about these animals, but 
also have your eyes opened to connec-
tions you would have never noticed on 
your own. 
This book belongs in every good li-
brary. It will help animal lovers and edu-
cators gain a new way of looking at the 
diversity of mammals. 
U 
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hen we are able to encoun-
ter nature “working and 
alive, striving out of the 
whole into the parts,” we 
come to see the whole reflected in the part 
because the part is an expression of the 
whole—literally a part-ial expression. 
When we look in this way, we really see 
the unity of nature as the dynamical unity 
of self-difference and, hence, in the mode 
of the intensive dimension of One. It is es-
pecially characteristic of what is living 
that, in philosopher Ron Brady’s succinct 
phrase, “It is becoming other in order to re-
main itself” [1]. 
Anyone can practice this way of seeing. 
For example, one can see a particular fam-
ily of plants in its organic mode. It is an 
enlivening experience to observe the dif-
ferent members of a family such as the 
Rosaceae (rose, blackberry, strawberry, 
apple, and so forth) and realize they are 
One plant in the form of “multiplicity in 
unity.” How different this experience is 
from that of looking for what these differ-
ent plants have in common! 
 
A Phenomenology of mammals 
Though Goethe’s way of seeing works sat-
isfactorily with plants, one finds it intensi-
fied when looking at animals. Here, we 
turn to the extraordinary work of biologist 
Wolfgang Schad (2019) and ecologists 
Craig Holdrege (1998, 2003, 2009) and 
Mark Riegner (1993, 1998, 2008, 2013). 
Their research provides some of the best 
examples of the phenomenology of nature 
that we yet have. This work is rooted in a 
Goethean approach yet developed and pre-
sented with only minimal reference to 
Goethe. This distancing is important if 
phenomenological research on the whole-
ness of nature is to develop into a real sci-
ence. What is not needed is making Goethe 
into some sort of romantic scientific hero, 
battling against mainstream Western sci-
ence. 
All the themes I have discussed here [see 
Parts I–III] are exemplified in these animal 
studies when seen in the light of “multi-
plicity in unity” rather than “unity in mul-
tiplicity.” Schad’s book works as a “tem-
plate” for thinking in a new way. His per-
ceptive, readily-understandable examples, 
facilitate a new movement of thinking. As 
one studies the book, he or she is aston-
ished to see the wholeness of nature 
emerge in such a natural way that it seems 
as if it is there “in front of our very eyes” 
(but of course it is not). 
Schad’s way of seeing is so clear that 
I’m convinced it makes a far better intro-
duction to a Goethean phenomenology of 
nature than Goethe’s work on color that 
more often gets phenomenological atten-
tion [e.g., Bortoft 1996, pp. 212–36]. 
When we see nature “striving out of the 
whole into the parts,” via Schad’s example 
of mammals, we see in a way that is “inside 
out” to what is usual. We see how the 
whole enters into each part, which is there-
fore a part-ial expression of the whole [for 
more on Schad’s work, see this issue, pp. 
15–17, this issue of EAP]. 
This way of seeing naturally leads to a 
dynamical classification of the mammals 
instead of the static “pigeonhole” classifi-
cations with which we are more familiar. 
The difference between a thinking arising 
from a “coming into being” and a thinking 
arising from a “finished product” is expe-
rienced vividly in Schad’s account, which 
leads us to discover intrinsic relationships 
among mammals that otherwise would not 
be recognized. As Schad explains, 
 
Here, we witness the awesome inner logic 
of the organism and experience a diversity 
ordered in a living way and not merely 
schematized (Schad 2019, p. 4). 
 
In Schad’s understanding of mammals, we 
see the phenomenological science of na-
ture clearly—i.e., that it is phenomenolog-
ical in Husserl’s sense because it returns to 
“the things themselves.” Schad’s work on 
animal wholeness also exemplifies Witt-
genstein’s new kind of understanding (re-
placing explanation) that consists in seeing 
relationships—i.e., recognizing the way 
whereby things (in this case, mammals) 
“already stand in connection with one an-
other” (the “grammar” of the mammals) 
[2]. 
 
Intrinsic relationships 
The phenomenologist of nature sees the in-
trinsic relationships and necessary struc-
tures that, otherwise, would appear only 
externally as contingent facts. Holdrege’s 
research on the “whole organism” begins 
with Goethe’s remark that “Every creature 
has its own reason to be.” This phrase de-
scribes precisely what a phenomenological 
science of wholeness is about: giving at-
tention to seeing the “idea” of the organism 
(in the same sense that we say, in practical 
life, “I’ve got the idea of it now”). In a sim-
ilar way, Husserl used the term essence 
(Wesen) by which he meant not something 
W 
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hidden behind the appearances or some 
supposed inner core but the characteristic 
way of being of something that presents it-
self directly in experience. 
This is what Holdrege (2009) does so 
beautifully in his work on the sloth. He 
shows how the characteristic way of this 
creature’s being reveals itself through a 
range of manifestations so that “Every de-
tail can begin to speak ‘sloth’.” 
Phenomenology does not try to explain 
but to understand. It tries to catch sight of 
the intrinsic intelligibility of the phenome-
non (“its own reason to be”) instead of 
leaving the phenomenon and thereby ex-
plaining it by means of something outside 
itself. When we begin to see the whole an-
imal, then each of its details is seen to be 
consistent with the characteristic way of 
that animal’s being. 
For example, we see this characteristic 
way of being in the giraffe, a mammal that 
cannot be considered in isolation from 
other mammals if we are to come to expe-
rience the being-what-it-is. In other words, 
the giraffe must be seen in the context of 
all the other mammals within the order of 
ungulates. The most striking feature of the 
giraffe—its long neck—becomes intrinsi-
cally intelligible when one realizes that: 
 
The tendency [of ungulates] towards elon-
gation is carried to an extreme in a very 
particular way in the giraffe, which does 
not merely have a long neck. Rather, this 
length is mirrored in the formation of the 
rest of its body, especially in its very long 
legs (Schad 2019, p. 667). 
 
When the wholeness of the giraffe is 
seen, every detail begins to speak “gi-
raffe.” The long neck is now no longer seen 
as a contingent feature, an accidental de-
velopment resulting from random variation 
and natural selection but as a necessary ex-
pression of the characteristic way of being 
that is the giraffe. This “elongation” is con-
sistent with all the other necessary mani-
festations of the giraffe’s “being-what-it-
is” so that one recognizes a coherent whole 
in which no detail is contingent. No longer 
is any creature just a bundle of accidental 
developments as claimed by current geno-
centric biology. 
It is a consequence of the way that mod-
ern biology developed that the organism as 
such has disappeared from view to be re-
placed by genes as the fundamental units 
of life [3]. As a counter to this reductive, 
genetic view of organism, an alternative 
“organo-centric” biology—i.e., a biology 
of the whole organism—cannot possibly 
be overestimated. Even without consider-
ing the genetic factor, the conventional ten-
dency among biologists is to see organisms 
in a mechanical fashion—i.e., as an aggre-
gate of parts rather than an organism-as-
whole. 
One example is Holdrege’s study of the 
cow (Holdrege 2004, ch. 4), which demon-
strates how the isolation of a single fac-
tor—milk production—leads to unhealthy 
practices that would be ended immediately 
if we saw the organism as a whole and not 
just an aggregate of traits and functions. 
When the organism is seen as no more than 
an aggregate of bits, then it seems quite 
natural, now that biotechnology is availa-
ble, to simply change one part of the crea-
ture, independently of other parts. With ge-
netic engineering, this piecemeal manipu-
lation of organisms is commonplace. As 
Holdrege (1998, p. 230) concludes: 
 
In this respect, the ignorance of the life of 
organisms in our day is staggering, and 
Goethe’s approach is needed more than 
ever. 
 
One of the most significant values of 
Goethean science is countering this reduc-
tive, piecemeal approach to the natural 
world, particularly as one might facilitate 
research and education in Goethean phe-
nomenology. 
 
Appearance and being together 
By facilitating a “coming-into-being” ra-
ther than assuming a finished product, 
Goethe avoided a metaphysical dualism 
without falling into the flatland of positiv-
ism. He avoided separating being and ap-
pearance, where being is “behind” the ap-
pearance, without reducing everything to 
“merely” appearance. Instead, appearance 
is the manifestation of being [4]. 
Goethe’s dynamical mode of conscious-
ness is in tune with a development in think-
ing that has gradually developed over the 
last 200 years. There has been a shift away 
from thinking in terms of static endpoints. 
There has been a shift toward thinking in 
terms of coming-into-being.  
This dynamical mode of understanding 
is illustrated in quantum physics, which 
has moved away from thinking in terms of 
entities in their finished state. One example 
is the development of so-called “elemen-
tary particle” physics, which provides an 
exceptional illustration of the need to think 
in a dynamical, transformative way. Phys-
icist Werner Heisenberg never tired of 
pointing out that there really are no ele-
mentary particles comprising the ultimate 
building blocks of the universe or the ulti-
mate constituents of matter. He maintained 
that our familiar language of “division” 
and “consists of” is highly inappropriate 
and obstructs our understanding of the re-
markable processes actually taking place. 
Experiments with high-energy machines 
do not show the fragmentation of matter 
but, rather, its dynamical unity. All the dif-
ferent “particles” that appear are in fact 
mutable forms of one another and self-dif-
fering forms in which energy-matter can 
appear. 
What is observed in these revealing ex-
periments should be seen in the manner of 
the dynamical unity of self-difference, pro-
ducing “multiplicity in unity”—i.e., a 
mode of the intensive dimension of One. 
Instead of fragmentation, there is unity, al-
beit in a form that we weren’t expecting 
and therefore overlooked at first. On the 
other hand, when we say that such experi-
ments are revealing the fundamental build-
ing blocks of matter, we project our think-
ing backward and see the situation back-to-
front. In other words, we lose sight of the 
formative processes and only see instead 
the finished products—yet another in-
stance of trying to reach the milk by way 
of the cheese [5]. 
 
A dynamic phenomenology 
Instances of this dynamical way of 
thinking are not confined to science alone. 
In various ways, this approach is a hall-
mark of some of the major movements in 
twentieth-century philosophy, especially 
in the case of phenomenology. 
The shift of attention from what Husserl 
called “the natural attitude” to seeing the 
taken-for-grantedness of that natural atti-
tude has the effect that we catch (but not 
catch hold of) “the world” coming into be-
ing. We then see how “the world” is con-
stituted in experience, whereas, in the nat-
ural attitude, we begin at the end with the 
world as independent object (what is 
“given”) and then try to explain experience 
in terms of the world (instead of under-
standing the way that the world is consti-
tuted in experience). 
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Beginning at the end, we ask 
how our experience “in here” is 
related to the world “out there.” 
Thus, we begin with the separa-
tion of subject from object, 
whereas in phenomenological 
seeing, we catch the coming into 
being of this separation. We re-
alize that any representational 
theory of knowledge based on 
this subject-object separation 
ends in a cul de sac because it 
starts from the end and therefore 
gets things “back-to-front.” Any 
representational theory of 
knowledge is another case of 
milk and cheese. 
A particularly good example 
of the dynamical mode of think-
ing typical of phenomenology is provided 
by Gadamer’s understanding of hermeneu-
tics, which begins with the coming into be-
ing of meaning in the event of understand-
ing (rather than beginning with meaning as 
a finished product in the author’s mind). 
By following the coming into being of 
meaning in the event of understanding, we 
discover that this experience takes the form 
of the dynamical unity of self-difference. 
When we see the way that Gadamer’s her-
meneutics illustrates the dynamical unity 
of self-difference, we find the closeness to 
Goethe’s organics quite astonishing! 
 
Modes of counterfeit wholeness 
I end by emphasizing that the science of 
wholeness can take two counterfeit forms, 
the first of which is systems thinking, 
which ranges from Ludwig von Ber-
talanffy’s “general systems theory” (Ber-
talanffy 1968) to Ervin Laszlo’s “evolu-
tionary systems theory” (Laszlo 1987). 
Whatever its specific formulation, systems 
thinking claims to be a science of whole-
ness. These formulations are a “mechanis-
tic” counterfeit in the sense that, no matter 
how sophisticated, they ultimately fail to 
escape from the mechanistic paradigm 
they claim to counter—the so-called “Car-
tesian” or “Newtonian paradigm.” 
One key problem with systems thinking 
is that it sees things in isolation from one 
another and therefore ignores the ways in 
which things already belong together. Un-
aware of this intrinsic relationality, these 
theorists arbitrarily identify parts that are 
not really of the whole because they don’t 
belong [6]. 
Holism is the second counterfeit form of 
a science of wholeness. In contrast to sys-
tems theory, holism overreaches the whole 
in that, whatever form it takes, this manner 
of understanding always turns wholeness 
into something metaphysical. Often irra-
tional, mystical, and pseudo-spiritual, this 
manner of holistic thinking typically re-
jects science and has too often been used 
as a front for prejudice and domination, the 
most egregious example being Germany’s 
National Socialism. Too often Goethe has 
been unfairly associated with holism, as in 
the “Goethe against Newton” syndrome. 
This association has done much to harm 
Goethe’s remarkable contribution to the 
evolution of scientific thinking. 
I summarize the three contrasting ap-
proaches to wholeness via the diagram 
above. Note that in both counterfeit ver-
sions, the movement of understanding is 
away from the phenomenon as that phe-
nomenon is in itself. In contrast, Goethe’s 
approach moves into the parts as they illu-
minate the whole. An authentic science of 
wholeness as exemplified by Goethe’s 
phenomenological approach should today 
interest all individuals who aim for a fruit-
ful balance between the pitfalls of intellec-
tualism, on one hand, and mystical pseudo-
science, on the other.  
 
Notes 
1. Brady 1987, p. 286. 
2. See Part I for Bortoft’s remarks on 
Wittgenstein. 
3. See Goodwin 1994. 
4. As Gadamer (1989, p. 484) explained, 
“being is self-presentation.” 
5. Bortoft draws on this phrase several 
times in Parts I–III of this series. 
6. In Wholeness of Nature, Bortoft 
(1996, p. 290) writes: “[Systems thinking] 
tries to put together what already belongs 
together. Thus the intrinsic relatedness is 
not seen, and instead, external connections 
are introduced with a view to overcoming 
separation. But the form of such connec-
tions is such that they, too, belong to the 
level of separation.” 
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Bortoft Lectures on-line 
Writer Simon Robinson has up-
loaded on YouTube several lectures 
that Henri Bortoft presented on 
wholeness at Schumacher College in 
the 2000s. These lectures are an ex-
cellent introduction to Bortoft’s 
thinking, including his understanding 
of Goethean science. The links are 
below.  
    There is also available a tape re-
cording of Bortoft’s presentation at 
the 2011 J. G. Bennett’s Dramatic 
Universe conference; this link is 
listed below after the Schumacher 
links. Note that, in the early 1960s, 
Bortoft was a researcher under the 
direction of Bennett. 
 
Bortoft’s Schumacher lectures 
 
Lecture 1: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?tim
e_continue=8&v=iGEl2E2CcTo 
 
Lecture 2, Part I: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?tim
e_continue=1&v=1Tzx5EOWHe0 
 
Lecture 2, Part II: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?tim
e_con-
tinue=351&v=UmdLQMlV3KE 
 
Lecture 3: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?tim
e_continue=1&v=nsH6-n7BUtw 
 
Lecture 4, Part I: 
https://transitionconsciousness.word-
press.com/2018/12/30/the-henri-
bortoft-lectures-day-four-part-one-2/ 
 
Lecture 4, Part II: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
aCywGtSeWi4 
 
Lecture 4, Part III: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?tim
e_continue=2&v=thMjGQzhEN0 
 
Lecture 5, Part I: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I
LVxvP_S9zI 
 
Lecture 5, Part II: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
LLy14NKt0TQ 
 
Bortoft’s J. G. Bennett lecture 
https://soundcloud.com/seandotcom-
1/du-008-henri-bortoft 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
21
Environmental & Architectural Phenomenology, Vol. 31 [], No.
ISSN: 1083-9194
 22 
 
 
Walking the Dog Phenomenologically 
David Ferlic 
 
Ferlic grew up outside Chicago and lives in Denver, Colorado. His earlier essay about speedskating appeared in the winter/spring 
2019 issue of EAP. SmileHi@comcast.net. Text and photograph © 2020 David Ferlic. 
 
alking my dog Waffle 
is an essential, twice-
daily activity. Typi-
cally, my wife Trisha 
leads, and I “pick up after.” Waffle is 
a “small” brindle English Mastiff. 
Yes, there are “small” Mastiffs, 
though the term is relative, since 
Waffle weighs some 140 pounds. 
We’ve had Waffle for five years and 
don’t really know his age because he 
is a “rescue” dog about whose back-
ground we know nothing. 
Here, I describe one particular 
walk with Waffle, in which my atten-
tion of the world was suddenly al-
tered. The weather changed dramati-
cally as the wind picked up and the 
sky filled with clouds. It began to 
storm. Claps of thunder and bursts of 
lightening filled the sky. Rain poured 
down. 
We weren’t frightened. In fact, I 
felt invigorated. No need to turn 
around, at least not yet. Instead of my 
usually being annoyed, angered, and 
wearied by the rush hour traffic par-
alleling the sidewalk, I was thrilled. 
Our pace quickened. Instead of the 
oppressive pall of auto exhausts, I 
saw only the beautiful panorama of the 
Rocky Mountain front range. Rather than 
noticing the hubbub of Denver traffic, I at-
tended to the wetness of the rain and the 
sweetness of the air. There was only the 
sound of thunder and rain on the grass. 
I want to delineate this experience via 
time, space, and movement. The time is a 
weekday, summer-afternoon rush hour in a 
large American city. Like many summer 
afternoons in Denver, the sky had clouded 
up. Rather than take our regular walk 
around the block, Trisha, Waffle, and I 
headed to “Inspiration Point,” an elevated 
city park about two miles from our home 
and a destination we have walked to many 
times, even though this park is surrounded 
by two busy interstate freeways and a third 
not far away.  
As a space, the park includes a moder-
ately trafficked loop trail slightly less than 
a mile long. Recently, we had avoided In-
spiration Point because of smog that ob-
scured the mountains and dirty vegetation 
sullied by pollution particles. Unlike many 
city parks, Inspiration Point is not irri-
gated. Its xeriscape conserves water and is 
beautiful, making a landscape described as 
“high desert.” Today, only the three of 
us are in the park. Ordinarily, the wind 
and rain disturb me when they inten-
sify, but the gusts made me feel moti-
vated and almost driven. The rain 
cleansed the vegetation, covered with 
twinkling droplets of water every-
where. I could see mountains in be-
tween the rapidly shifting nimbus 
clouds. 
Our movement quickened. Instead of 
habitually strolling, we walked much 
faster, ducking the rain as best we could 
and reveling in an invigorating environ-
ment. I was aroused and excited: no 
hurry to return home because this sur-
prising experience felt so good, on one 
hand, yet, on the other hand, triggered a 
sense of caution and self-preservation. 
My description starts with the com-
mon event of dog walking. What I find 
remarkable is how such an everyday ac-
tion happening in less-everyday cir-
cumstances can alter one's sense of be-
ing-in-the-world. Very possibly every 
sunrise and sunset might render similar 
experiences, if only we were alert. Giv-
ing attention to day-to-day events like 
dog walking, as they actually happen, 
illustrates how consciousness and in-
tentionality are not static, hypothetical 
constructs but rather, revealing, living il-
lustrations of being-in-the-world. 
 
A sad update from the author: “I’m sorry 
to report that Waffle passed away in the 
mountains on Sunday, November 3. We 
were visiting Red Feather Lakes, took a 
walk, and gave him treats. He lay down 
and died very peacefully. I guess that is 
how we all want to go.” 
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ountries are constantly 
redefining and reimagin-
ing the meanings of the 
past. Memorials, muse-
ums, and cemeteries are vehicles 
for such negotiations of remember-
ing and forgetting. Such sites rep-
resent often conflicting and fluid 
social and political landscapes of 
memory. These places relate to co-
lonial and post-colonial narratives 
of control, nationalism, and devel-
opment. The representations of 
public national histories are, as 
White (1997, p. 4) argues, also acts 
of “mystification, silencing, and 
exclusion.” 
At the same time, “inscribed spaces” like 
museums and cemeteries also have the po-
tential to create meaningful relationships 
by engaging and transforming such ac-
cepted national narratives (Low and Law-
rence-Zuniga 2003, Wright 2005). Ceme-
teries are often more open, ambiguous 
spaces than those of museums, which may 
have controlled and regulated stories. 
Cemeteries inhabit an intersection of tradi-
tion, memory, and place, and can offer the 
potential for both renewal and critique 
(Donohoe 2014). The interaction of people 
and space in cemeteries is more likely to 
create uncertainties and heterotopias than 
within museum spaces. 
As both a spatial and cultural category, 
however, the ambiguity, or “messiness” of 
cemeteries frequently contrasts with the vi-
sion of order imposed by political and 
knowledge regimes (Kusno 2016). Ja-
karta’s Taman Prasasti (“Inscription 
Park”) cemetery and now museum simul-
taneously represents and contests official 
regimes of order and the processes of 
messy ambiguity. Taman Prasasti embod-
ies many of Indonesia’s current contradic-
tions regarding its past and present and the 
meanings of memory and place. 
 
Death, Development, & Cemeteries 
In the burgeoning cities of Southeast Asia, 
available land for burying the dead is re-
portedly running out (Jakarta Post, March 
12, 2011). Development has put pressure 
on urban green space, including cemeter-
ies. One casualty of this development in In-
donesia is Chinese cemeteries, many of 
which have been closed or relocated in ur-
ban and rural areas in the last few decades 
(Salmon 2016, Husain 2015). For example, 
a wonderful Chinese cemetery I visited in 
Yogyakarta, Central Java, was razed in 
1998, relocated to a more rural area south 
of the city, and replaced by a new mosque 
on the Gadjah Mada University campus 
(Susanto 2008, Browne forthcoming).  
In response to these changes, some en-
trepreneurs have developed “Memorial 
Parks” in countries such as The Philip-
pines, Malaysia, and Indonesia (Salmon 
2016). These suburban memorial 
(or “heritage”) parks represent a 
hybrid form, combining a recrea-
tional experience for families 
with luxurious cemetery plots, in 
some cases for only Chinese bur-
ials, and in others for those of all 
faiths. A prominent example is 
that of San Diego Hills in the Ja-
karta suburb of Tangerang, which 
has sections devoted to different 
religions and a separate section 
for “Indonesian Heroes.” These 
new hybrid parks also reflect the 
trend in Indonesia toward pack-
aged “culture” experiences, seen 
prominently in places like Taman 
Mini’s Indonesian ethnic culture pavilions 
(Hitchcock 2005). 
Located in the heart of Jakarta, Taman 
Prasasti [photo, right] is a different kind of 
hybrid burial site dating to early colonial 
times It reflects the tension between the 
regulating forces of a bureaucratic moder-
nity and those of a more entropic, local 
sense of place. Taman Prasasti engages In-
donesia’s current debates about its past, 
current priorities, and future. The site 
brings forward the question of which mem-
ories should be held and preserved or ig-
nored and erased. 
Currently, Taman Prasasti inhabits a 
liminal, indeterminate zone, partway be-
tween the stated desire for it to be a domes-
ticated museum, on one hand, and a wild, 
untamed cemetery, on the other hand. This 
conflicting aim reflects a poorly imple-
mented rationalist agenda, lacking the 
funding and vision of a “modern” museum. 
C 
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Nor does its spooky, unregulated 
atmosphere fit with an optic-
friendly, bureaucratic vision for 
a modern, world-class city. 
Most broadly, this initiative 
fails to engage with either the 
stories of the past or the uncan-
niness of graveyards and their in-
tersubjectivity. The result is that 
the cemetery’s poetic potential is 
left untapped. Taman Prasasti is 
missing the opportunity to sim-
ultaneously educate the public 
and engage this important space 
in a dialogue about the meanings 
of the past and present.  
 
Taman Prasasti’s History 
The “invention” of non-church graveyards 
for interring the dead in European coun-
tries was primarily a nineteenth-century 
phenomenon, and in some instances was 
predated by those in their respective colo-
nies. For example, in Calcutta, India, the 
first cemetery for British colonists was be-
gun at the end of the eighteenth century 
(Buettner 2006), whereas in England such 
expansive, non-church cemeteries like the 
famous Kensal Green Cemetery in London 
was opened in 1833 (in Paris the iconic 
Pere-Lachaise cemetery opened in 1804). 
In the Dutch East Indies, the Kebon Jahe 
Kober cemetery was officially established 
in 1797 in Batavia (now Jakarta) for Dutch 
East Indies (VOC) officials, the Dutch up-
per class, and other prominent Europeans, 
though burials had already occurred on the 
site beginning in 1795 (Messakh 2008). 
This pattern was contemporaneous with 
similar developments in The Netherlands 
itself, where “countryside cemeteries” also 
began in the late eighteenth century as 
well, due to concerns about over-crowding 
in churchyard burial sites and issues of hy-
giene (Van Steen & Pellenbarg, 2006). 
Over the following 200-plus years, Kebon 
Jahe Kober became important not only for 
who was buried there but also for its eclec-
tic mix of gravestones and markers, incor-
porating neo-gothic, classical, and Hindu-
Javanese styles. Over the centuries, the 
cemetery has also undergone a number of 
significant transformations until becoming 
its present incarnation as the Taman 
Prasasti Museum. 
Many Europeans and Americans are 
buried alongside Indonesians in the ceme-
tery, including the reform-minded Olivia 
Raffles, first wife of Thomas Raffles, the 
governor-general of Java during Britain’s 
brief (1811–1815) rule. Others include 
Pieter Erberveld (ca. 1660–April 14, 
1722), a Eurasian accused of plotting to 
overthrow the Dutch VOC and executed 
(and vilified by the Dutch with a gruesome 
monument); the Chinese-Indonesian Soe 
Hok Gie, a political activist, writer, and 
lecturer; the archeologist W.F. Stutter-
heim, best known for his excavations in 
Central Java; F.H. Roll, the founder of the 
first medical school in Jakarta for the train-
ing of Indonesian doctors; and J.L.A. 
Brandes, a philologist and lexicographer of 
important ancient Indonesian manuscripts. 
 
Ghosts of the Past 
The growth of the mega-city of Jakarta 
since independence has been haphazard 
and messy (Abeyesekere 1987). This 
messiness contrasts with Indonesia’s mod-
ernization goal, which during the 1966–
1998 New Order era sought to impose a 
particular way of seeing (Kusno 2016) 
onto public spaces—a political strategy of 
control designed to relegate the more un-
ruly urban spaces to the margins of society. 
This messiness, with its marginal sites, 
story fragments, amnesias, and silences 
takes on importance in the processes of 
city-work (Pile 2005). In addition to its 
spatial fluidities, the everyday emotional 
and even grief-work of a city is always in 
process amid the anxieties and desires of 
its residents and the plasticity of time. Such 
work, involving spatial tactics of “re-
sistance” to narratives of power (Certeau 
1984) often includes mobility and detach-
ment from rationalized spaces.  
These spaces of indeterminacy 
include those involving relations 
with the dead and the past in gen-
eral, implicating memory, place, 
and tradition. 
In Indonesia, the dead often 
have a way of leaving ghostly 
traces in the present. One of these 
ways is through the common 
practice of gravesite vigils that 
are held regularly on Thursday 
nights and other propitious times 
throughout Java (Browne 2007, 
Pemberton 1994). The dead, es-
pecially saints and prominent po-
litical figures, are believed by 
many people to be able to confer 
blessings (pangestu) to the living. 
People may visit the graves of famous and 
powerful people, such as that of Senopati, 
the founder of the Central Javanese Mata-
ram dynasty in Yogyakarta. These visitors 
ask for help with everything from healing 
from illness, paying school tuition, fertility 
problems, and business success (Browne 
2007). 
Many ghostly presences also linger from 
the long Dutch colonial occupation of In-
donesia, with its uncountable traumas and 
injustices. These presences intermingle 
with those of the repressive post-colonial 
era in the urban landscape. The most prom-
inent among these many post-colonial 
traumas is the killings of half a million or 
more suspected Communists and others in 
Indonesia following the aborted coup at-
tempt of October 1965 (Roosa 2006). 
Since the fall of Suharto and the collapse 
of the New Order regime in 1998, the city 
is also now haunted by the ghosts of pem-
bangunan (development), with “an abun-
dance of skeletons of unfinished build-
ings” (Pratiwo and Nas 2005, p. 79). 
The ghosts of the past speak to experi-
ences of loss, destabilizing time and space, 
and the attempts to rationalize a coherent 
modernist narrative. These ghosts haunt 
the margins and indeterminate spaces of 
the city, as well as the sites of traumatic ex-
perience (Kusno 2003). In interaction with 
human agents, they create hesitancies and 
encourage a “wanton speculation” (Hol-
loway and Kneale 2008, p. 308). Tim 
Edensor (2005, p. 829) argues that margin-
alized urban sites “seethe with memories,” 
where ghostly presences cannot be ex-
punged. This is in contrast to rationalized 
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museum and heritage sites 
that try to banish ambiguity. 
As a transitional and inde-
terminate site, Taman 
Prasasti is haunted not only 
by those who are buried there 
but by those who are no 
longer there, by the spirits of 
those who work and visit the 
cemetery, and by these col-
lective experiences of loss. It 
is a liminal and ambiguous 
site, where efforts to disci-
pline and control its narrative 
are contested by its wildness, 
haunting memories, and un-
certain experiences. 
 
Memory & Forgetting in Indonesia 
Cemeteries are places of forgetting as well 
as remembering, through deliberate hu-
man choices as well as various processes 
of entropy. Choices about what is worthy 
of remembering may allow other things to 
be forgotten (Donohoe 2014, p. 147). Co-
lonialist-era spaces such as cemeteries can 
be uncomfortable reminders of an oppres-
sive past. After independence, colonial 
markers of remembering, whether used to 
glorify or vilify (as with the Erberveld 
“monument”), gave way to post-colonial 
narratives of national development and 
identity and deliberate tactics of forget-
ting. 
Discourses of nationalism and develop-
ment often create emotional and temporal 
distance from such colonialist markers. 
These ruptures, however, never provide a 
complete break, as there are always con-
tingencies, conflicts, and leakages of the 
past into the present. As Latour (2009, p. 
142) phrases it, “The global is always part 
of local histories.” 
The perception and experience of place 
seem especially porous in cemeteries (Ca-
sey 2009). They invoke a diverse range of 
meanings in and outside the material space 
they occupy, engaging post-colonial dia-
logues with the past, present, and future 
with local meanings and global flows. 
They are ongoing historical processes, 
public forms of knowledge created in part 
by the participation of those who visit. 
These spaces help to shape historical 
knowledge and the narratives of empire, 
liberation struggles, and national develop-
ment. They are also spaces of physical de-
terioration and change, and sometimes of 
preservation and re-classification. 
Decisions about remembering and for-
getting are not permanent. Organized 
around artifacts and institutions, new fis-
sures, fragments, and priorities emerge 
through time, and narratives are reworked. 
Decisions to remember come with emo-
tional and social freight. Whether to en-
gage in meaningful dialogue with the past 
and its associated traumas or to support a 
sanitized silence in service of modernity 
and control, these choices are political and 
cultural (Kusno 2003). For instance, Indo-
nesia has only recently begun, through 
personal accounts and various artistic 
forms, to modestly acknowledge and de-
bate the echoing silence imposed by the 
New Order regime following the wide-
scale atrocities of 1965–66.  
Given this violent history, memorials 
and cemeteries can be sites of ambiva-
lence and anxiety, engaging with ongoing 
national dialogues about the past. In some 
instances, these sites are subject to regu-
lating and revisionist policies of state con-
trol, and in others are left more open to 
subjective renderings and experience. In 
Indonesia, these considerations include ar-
ticulations of “tradition” and its legitimi-
zation narratives (Pemberton 1994), the 
lack of urban green space and available 
burial sites, and the desire to create “pe-
destrian spaces” to attract domestic tour-
ists.  
 
Situating Taman Prasasti 
Indonesia declared its independence from 
The Netherlands in August 1945, and the 
history of Taman Prasasti since illustrates 
its varied, contingent status. The site was 
used as a Christian cemetery until 1975, 
when it was closed to prepare for con-
struction of the Central Jakarta mayoralty 
office (Messakh 2008). At that time, some 
remains were removed by relatives, and 
others were moved to South Jakarta’s 
Tanah Kusir cemetery. Only 1200 of the 
4200 gravestones present at the time were 
selected to be kept in the new site (Mes-
sakh 2008). 
In 1977, the site was reopened and in-
augurated as the Taman Prasasti museum, 
with its area reduced from the original 5.9 
hectares of land to 1.3 hectares. In addi-
tion to the gravestones and markers that 
have been preserved, there are also some 
curious additions, such as a replica of a 
seventeenth-century hearse and the origi-
nal coffins of Indonesia’s first President 
and Vice-President, Sukarno and Moham-
med Hatta. 
This transformation from colonial-era 
cemetery to national museum is a modern-
ist attempt to rationalize and decolonize 
Taman Prasasti and to domesticate its 
wildness to create a more docile rhetorical 
space (Wright 2005). This move is conso-
nant with other efforts to modernize public 
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spaces in Indonesia under the general ru-
bric of development. These efforts are of-
ten only partially realized, however, and 
may result in half-finished structures or 
lip-service “successes.” 
At Taman Prasasti, this rationalist dis-
course is undermined by the ambiguity one 
experiences when visiting, with unex-
pected encounters with the past and pre-
sent. The cemetery is located off a busy 
corner in north Jakarta, inconspicuous and 
largely invisible unless one is looking for 
it. The transition from the street into the 
cemetery is palpable. Walter Benjamin 
(1999) evokes the metaphor of “threshold 
magic” for the liminal transition from more 
rationalized spaces into indeterminate 
ones, and the sense of possibility that 
“something” might happen. 
This is true when leaving street conges-
tion and emerging into an ambiguous space 
like Taman Prasasti, with its minimal sign-
age and lack of prescribed circuits. After 
paying a nominal entrance fee, I was free 
to wander the grounds however I wished 
(and I was the only visitor for most of the 
time). During my visit, I sensed no unify-
ing narrative or theme—only partial stories 
and questions. The lack of organization in-
vites a meandering visit rather than a pre-
scribed experience. The lack of official 
staff, with only a few maintenance workers 
and grass cutters occasionally in sight, en-
courages an openness of interpretation. 
This indeterminacy and engagement of 
the senses, with the lush and overgrown 
vegetation and unexpected monuments and 
other memorials, ignites the imagination. 
There are many possible paths in the cem-
etery, and sensory attention is dispersed. 
There is also a multitude of non-human life 
forms that have agency (Latour 2005), in-
cluding trees and overgrown vegetation, 
and swarms of small mosquitoes and other 
insects, along with the haphazard built en-
vironment. This low-lying area is also sub-
ject to the annual flooding that afflicts Ja-
karta during the rainy season. 
These porous boundaries constitute 
“leakages” (Ingold 2012) that contest the 
museum’s official purpose and narrative. 
The excess of meanings available in the 
cluttered look and feel of the cemetery in-
vites visitors to fantasize and create their 
own stories of an imagined past. The sen-
sory excess leads to a relaxation of the ob-
server’s gaze and can produce involuntary 
associations, memories, and story crea-
tion—a kind of magical aura (Benjamin 
1999) that resists strategies of control and 
order (Edensor 2005). 
In many ways, my visit to Taman 
Prasasti mirrors a common experience in 
Java, where official attempts to control and 
rationalize public life are undercut by leak-
ages from the physical and social environ-
ment. Centuries of colonial and post-colo-
nial repressive governments have led to a 
divergence between official and lived real-
ities. Official policies and development 
narratives are often so at odds with experi-
ences of messiness on the ground that they 
take on a dream-like quality (Pile 2005, 
Benjamin 1999). Empty declarations of 
“progress” and modernity are made for the 
sake of appearance, while no resources or 
unifying vision or plan are in place or even 
intended to be implemented, creating het-
erotopic and dissonant spaces.  
These modernist impulses to reintegrate 
the disjunctive fragments of city life are 
subverted by the clutter of marginal 
spaces—what Attfield (2000) describes as 
the “wild dimension” of objects. Residents 
and visitors to such sites of messy indeter-
minacy become subjective co-creators, ex-
periencing a sense of “wild Being” imma-
nent in such perceptions (Casey 2009). 
Various processes of entropy, whether 
from human or non-human actions, also 
take their toll on the material culture of 
such places, including graffiti and vandal-
ism, suggesting the lack of a coherent, 
meaningful integration narrative about the 
cemetery’s place in Indonesian society, as 
well as inadequate security (Bastian 2012). 
As Certeau (1984, p. 83) has argued, 
memory is a transformative narrative prac-
tice and thus is potentially subversive in its 
subjectivity. Such uncertainty allows peo-
ple to be in dialogue with places and co-
create meanings, articulating a poetic ge-
ography. These geographies store up the 
kind of “rich silences and wordless stories” 
that Certeau (1984, p. 106) says destabilize 
political strategies of control. This indeter-
minacy of experience invites an urban im-
aginary, a juxtaposition of the strange and 
familiar, and an engagement with the spir-
its of place (ibid., p. 135). Official im-
pulses to restore and control, to establish 
cultural orthodoxies, are continually at 
odds with these heterodoxies of the past. 
The challenge for city planners is how to 
balance needs for security, social cohesion, 
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and shared stories with the need to dia-
logue with such ambiguous spaces. 
 
Ambiguous Spaces & Containment 
Taman Prasasti embodies some of these 
contested narratives of preservation, of the 
heritage and culture industry, and of glob-
alization. The museum’s director, Hendra 
Handoyo, is quoted as stating that “One of 
the reasons we are undergoing renovation 
is to dissipate the spooky ambiance and 
create a more museum-friendly environ-
ment,” with the hope of attracting local 
tourists (Bastian 2012). The museum’s ne-
gotiation of the past’s meanings, however, 
is haphazard and lacks clarity. Despite its 
museum status and stated goals, Taman 
Prasasti retains a sense of wildness and 
lack of order. While the new agenda of the 
museum is one of containment of the wild 
aspects of the cemetery, its presentation re-
mains one of “clutter” and uncertainty.  
Containment efforts such as with the Ta-
man Prasasti museum can only be partial at 
best, subject to the interpenetrating 
rhythms of weather, nature, and disjunc-
tive human actions of politics, vandalism, 
and neglect (Mels 2004). Currently, the 
museum directors seek to close down the 
contestation of meanings and to sanitize 
the wildness in favor of an “educational” 
narrative suitable for Indonesian school-
children. 
This attempted purification and taming 
of the cemetery’s “wild being” is not so 
easily achieved, however. The ambiguity 
and uncertainty of wildness have ways of 
continuing their porous journeys. The lack 
of funding for the museum paradoxically 
works against its stated purpose of order-
ing the cemetery for a more official narra-
tive purpose, instead inviting a more elu-
sive and less controlled imagination of 
space and time (Massey 2005). 
In addition, this porosity creates an 
openness to chance and the possibility of 
surprise, as visitors are thrown back onto 
their own subjectivity (Donohoe 2014). 
Museum visitors continue to be confronted 
with many possible meanings and paths, 
both literal and imaginative. In such 
places, memory is unstable—a palimpsest 
of decaying fragments and shadows of the 
past (Donohoe 2014). Such uncertainty re-
calls Latour’s argument that, while 
modernism is good at breaking with the 
past, it is not effective at inhabiting the pre-
sent (Latour 2009, p. 144).  
As an “Inscription Park,” Taman 
Prasasti evokes a poly-temporal sensibility 
and is an example of writing the past and 
the future common in Javanese forms of 
representation (Florida 1995). As Jed-
lowski (2001, p. 30) points out, the past is 
“constantly selected, filtered, and restruc-
tured in terms set by the questions and ne-
cessities of the present.” Latour (1993, p. 
76) suggests a similar idea: “It is the sort-
ing that makes the times,” or what is kept 
and what is rejected influences our sense of 
the past as well as helping to shape the fu-
ture. 
In this sense, the current rhetoric of san-
itizing Taman Prasasti speaks simultane-
ously to the continuing distancing from the 
traumas and colonialism of the past as well 
as to an imagined future where history and 
culture are packaged and displayed in san-
itized and controlled environments. 
 
Possible Futures 
As with many cemeteries and other spaces 
of memory and historical contingency, the 
tensions and contradictions embodied in 
Taman Prasasti reflect this moment of 
non/modernity. The current official vision 
of Taman Prasasti is anti-poetic, seeking to 
create a sanitized, rationalized atmosphere 
for local school groups and a seeming eras-
ure of the more wild and overgrown as-
pects, to make it “less spooky” and encour-
age local rather than international tourists 
(Bastian 2012). This approach obscures the 
reality that containment, with its accompa-
nying sense of place, embodies both clutter 
and order (Attfield 2000). Even well-or-
dered museum sites can’t completely ban-
ish ambiguity and uncertain experiences, 
as wildness tends to find a way in (Edensor 
2005). 
Yet partial erasures, through the moving 
of gravestones and the neglect and desul-
tory maintenance of others, have markedly 
altered the site. Only fragments of these 
prior stories remain. This important histor-
ical landmark is in danger of serious deg-
radation. Many wonderful and historically 
important gravestones are damaged or 
missing (Bastian 2012). 
Taman Prasasti as a significant place of 
remembering seems to lack a meaningful 
preservation constituency. The museum is 
chronically under-funded, with minimal 
cleaning and restoration, and is vulnerable 
to environmental damage in Jakarta’s reg-
ular floods. There are also not many visi-
tors, at least at the time of my visit. The of-
ficial attempt to use the cemetery to bolster 
a national narrative of linear 
development and growth is 
belied by contingencies on 
the ground, its lack of a co-
hesive vision, and the inevi-
table leakages of materials 
and affective atmospheres 
through time and space. 
If such a rationalist con-
tainment narrative isn’t pos-
sible, what are the possibili-
ties for Taman Prasasti to 
become a more relevant site 
for dialogue about Indone-
sian historical memory? 
Nirwono Joga (cited in 
Messakh 2008), who has 
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studied Taman Prasasti, argues that it has 
the potential to be a major center of ceme-
tery studies in Asia. But it lacks an integra-
tion of its historical importance with con-
temporary Indonesian life. The oppor-
tunity, always difficult for regimes of 
power to embrace, is to engage in a dia-
logue that enables a poetic geography ra-
ther than merely a literal, politically favor-
able one. 
 
Engagement with Place 
The future of Taman Prasasti seems uncer-
tain. The stated goal is to create a modern, 
discontinuous and disciplined narrative, 
erasing bothersome fragments and ghosts, 
and discouraging participatory remember-
ing (Edensor 2005). Yet despite these ef-
forts, Taman Prasasti remains an ambigu-
ous space. A potential alternative to the im-
position of a sanitized, under-funded, and 
vandalized space where important history 
is being lost and ignored is to allow possi-
bilities to emerge from the participation of 
planners and visitors with the environment 
itself, embracing the ambiguity of what 
Holston (1999) calls the ethnographic pre-
sent. Donohoe (2014) argues for an en-
gagement with place that encourages atten-
tiveness to the ambiguity of the encounter 
and its possibilities amidst the politics of 
the time. 
Applied to Taman Prasasti, these ideas 
could help revitalize and renew the mean-
ings of the past, while encouraging a criti-
cal inquiry of received ideas. For Taman 
Prasasti, urban planners could engage the 
city and nation in a dialogue about the 
cemetery, its history, and its potential as a 
site of learning, creating a meaningful 
sense of place. This dialogue could recog-
nize the desire to utilize history-rich spaces 
for education purposes, while embracing 
the affective power and generative force 
evoked by such places. 
The anxieties of excess meaning and am-
biguity are uncomfortable for city planners 
and museum directors. But the benefits of 
fostering an open dialogue regarding Indo-
nesia’s past can be both educational and 
transformative. Taman Prasasti is currently 
isolated from its social environment and 
lacks in narrative power and the ability to 
globalize the local. An alternative to a 
completely rationalized museum-like 
space or a wholly overgrown and largely 
neglected and unvisited cemetery would be 
to embrace its ambiguity and create a more 
balanced, meaningful dialogue and experi-
ence. 
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Captions for Photographs 
p. 23: Entrance to Taman Prasati on Jl. Tanah Abang 1, 
Jakarta, Indonesia. 
p. 24: Tomb of Pieter Erverveld, with its gruesome 
skull “monument.” 
p. 25: Seventeenth-century hearse replica. 
p. 25: Skull carving on tombstone. 
p. 26: A more “regulated” section of the cemetery. 
p. 26: Ground-level view of the cemetery ambience. 
p. 27: “Crying lady” statue and grave marker. 
p. 27: Graffiti on one of the mausoleums. 
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『現象学の定義２３』 
[Japanese Translation of “Twenty-Three Definitions of 
Phenomenology”] 
Akihiro Yoshida 
 
This list of twenty-three definitions of phenomenology was originally compiled by the editor of Environmental and Architectural 
Phenomenology, as part of a special 30th-anniversary issue of the journal. Akihiro Yoshida, PhD, is Professor Emeritus of Psy-
chology at the University of Tokyo. This translation is also available at Yoshida’s blog: http://yoshidaakihiro.jimdo.com/. Japa-
nese translation © 2020 Akihiro Yoshida. 
  
編者David Seamon教授の言葉  
「現象学の定義２３」と題する、以下の定義リストは、電子雑誌『環境と建築の現象学』の編集者David Seamonが、
その創刊30周年記念特別号の一部として、蒐集編集したものです。この号には、「現象学は何処へ？」と題する、同
編集者による現象学研究の概観論稿が掲載されており、この特別号は、以下のウェブサイトから入手できます。 
 
1. Phenomenology is the study of human experience and of the ways things present themselves to us in and through such experience 
(Sokolowski 2000, p. 2). 
現象学は、人間経験の研究であり、また、もろもろの物事がそのような経験の中において、また、そのような経験を通し
て、われわれに、それら自身を現前させるもろもろの仕方の研究である。 
 
2. Phenomenology is the study of phenomena as experienced by human beings. The primary emphasis is on the phenomenon itself 
exactly as it reveals itself to the experiencing person in all its concreteness and particularity (Giorgi 1971, p. 9). 
現象学は人間存在によって経験される諸現象の研究である。その第一の力点は、その現象自体にあり、その現象の総ての
具体性と特殊性の中で、それを経験しつつある人間に対して、それ自体が自らを露わにするがままに、正確に研究するこ
とにある。 
 
3. Phenomenology takes its starting point in a return to the “things” or “matters” themselves, that is, the world as we experience it. In 
other words, for phenomenologists, experience must be treated as the starting point and ultimate court of appeal for all philosophical 
evidence (Brown and Toadvine 2003, p. xi). 
現象学はその出発点として、「物事」あるは「事物」そのものへの或る帰還に、―――つまり、われわれが経験するがま
まの世界に、―――置く。言い換えれば、現象学者たちにとっては、経験を、あらゆる哲学的証明の出発点と最終法廷と
して扱われなければならない、ということである。 
 
4. Phenomenology is the study of experience, particularly as it is structured through consciousness. “Experience” in this context refers 
not so much to accumulated evidence or knowledge as to something we “undergo.”  It is something that happens to us and not some-
thing accumulated and mastered by us. Phenomenology asks that we be open to experience in this sense (Friesen, Hendricksson, and 
Saevi 2012, p. 1). 
現象学は経験の、特に、意識を通して構造化されるものとしての経験の、研究である。この脈絡においては、「経験」と
は、蓄積された証拠あるいは知識を指すというよりも、われわれが「受ける・経験する（undergo）」或ることを、指し
ている。 経験とは、われわれに起こる或ことであり、われわれによって蓄積されたり、修得されたりする或ることでは
ない。 現象学は、この意味での経験に対してわれわれが開かれていることを求める。 
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5. The aim of Phenomenology is to describe the lived world of everyday experience …. Phenomenological research into individual 
experience gives insight into, and understanding of, the human condition. Sometimes it “languages” things we already know tacitly 
but have not articulated in depth. At other times, quite surprising insights reveal themselves … (Finlay 2011, p. 26). 
現象学の目的は、日常経験の生きられた世界を叙述することである。…… 個人経験の現象学的研究は人間条件への洞察
と理解をもたらす。 時には、それは、われわれが既に暗黙のうちに知っているが、[その意味を] 深く明瞭化しては未
だいない物事を『言語化する』。 別の時には、驚くような洞察が露わになることもある……。 
 
6. Phenomenology is best understood as a radical, anti-traditional style of philosophizing, which emphasizes the attempt to get to the 
truth of the matters, to describe phenomena, in the broadest sense as whatever appears in the manner in which it appears, that is as it 
manifests itself to consciousness, to the experience. As such, phenomenology’s first step is to seek to avoid all misconstructions and 
impositions placed on experience in advance, whether these are drawn from religious or cultural traditions, from everyday com-
monsense, or, indeed, from science itself. Explanations are not to be imposed before the phenomena have been understood from 
within (Moran 2000, p. 4).  
現象学とは、物事の根源から[始める]、反伝統的な或る一つのスタイルで、哲学することだ、とするのが最もよい理解で
ある。現象学のやり方は、もろもろの事柄の真理に迫ろうとし、最も広い意味での諸現象を、つまり、何事にせよ、それ
が現れる仕方で現れるそれを、それが意識に、経験に、露わになるそれという、最も広い意味での諸現象を、叙述する試
みに力点を置く。その様なものとして、現象学の第一歩は、経験に予め含まれてしまっている誤解や思い込みの総てを避
けようと努めることである。ここで、それらの誤解や思い込みが、宗教的な、あるいは、文化的なもろもろの伝統から、
日常生活の常識から、生じたものであろうと、あるいは、更にまた、たとえ、科学自体から生じたものであろうと、例外
は無いのだ。もろもろの説明は、当の諸現象が、その[現象の]内側から理解されるに至る以前に、[諸現象に]押し付けら
れてはならないのだ。 
 
7. As a method, [phenomenology] serves to remind us of the significance of the full range of meaning of human experience, including 
taken-for-granted assumptions, values, and perceptions often forgotten about in analytic frameworks. In attending to pre-thematic 
ways of being-in-the-world, phenomenology helps to comprehend human behavior in its fullness (Stefanovic 2015, p. 40). 
一つの方法として、（現象学は）人間経験の全範囲の意味の重要性をわれわれに留意させる役割を果たす。その[経験の
意味の] 範囲には、当然とされている思い込みや仮定、もろもろの価値、それから、分析的なもろもろの枠組みにおいて
、しばしば忘れ去られている諸々の知覚、などが含まれる。世界内存在の主題化以前のさまざまな在り方に注意を払うこ
とによって、現象学は、人間行動を十全に理解することを助ける。 
 
8. Phenomenological method is driven by a pathos: being swept up in a spell of wonder about phenomena as they appear, show, pre-
sent, or give themselves to us. In the encounter with the things and events of the world, phenomenology directs its gaze toward the 
regions where meanings and understandings originate, well up and percolate through the porous membranes of past sedimentations— 
then infuse, permeate, infect, touch, stir us, and exercise a formative and affective effect on our being (van Manen 2014, p. 26). 
現象学的方法は、或る情念（パトス）によって突き動かされている。それは、諸現象がわれわれに向けて現れる、姿を示
す、現前する、あるいは、自らを与える、その諸現象についての驚異の或る種の魔力に捕われる情念である。世界のもろ
もろの物事と出来事との出会いにおいて、現象学は、その眼差しを、意味や理解が発生する諸領域に差し向ける。その諸
領域では、もろもろの意味と理解が、沸き上がり、過去のもろもろの沈殿から成る多孔性の薄膜を通して、沁み出す、―
――そして、われわれに、沁み込み、浸透し、感染し、われわれをほろりとさせ、感動させる、そして、われわれの存在
に、形成的で情緒的な効果を及ぼすのである。 
 
9. Phenomenology is an attempt to understand from the inside—and not to dismiss or criticize from the outside—the whole spectrum 
of experience which we generally call “reality” (Vesely 1988, p. 59). 
 現象学は、われわれが一般的に『実在（現実）』と呼んでいる経験の全範囲を、内側から―――外側から簡単に片づけ
てしまったり、批判したり、せずに―――理解しようとする一つの試みである。 
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10. Phenomenology never purely coincides with lived experience in itself, but by probing its ultimate horizons and seeking to grasp 
the englobing sense of what appears within them, renders lived experience anew. The subject matter is the intelligibility of lived expe-
rience, which phenomenology realizes essentially, and it is in rendering this “intelligibility” that the faithfulness of phenomenology to 
lived experience lies (Burch 1989, p. 195). 
現象学は生きられる経験それ自体と純粋に一致することは決してない。しかし、その（生きられた経験の）究極のもろも
ろの地平を探究し、それらの内に現れるものに全体としてのまとまりを与える意味（englobing sense）を把握すること
を求めることによって、生きられた経験を新しく甦らせる。その主題は、生きられた経験の「理解可能性」であり、それ
を、現象学は本質的に実現する。そして、この＜理解可能性＞を与えること、その中にこそ、生きられた経験に対する、
現象学の忠実さが在るのだ。 
 
11. Phenomenology seems to take the ground away from under our feet, while at the same time giving us the sense of being where we 
have always been—only now recognizing it as if for the first time. It’s hard to catch hold of it because it’s like trying to catch some-
thing as it’s happening and which is over before we can do so. It can perhaps best be described most simply as “stepping back” into 
where we are already. This means shifting the focus of attention within experience into the experiencing of it. So if we consider see-
ing, for example, this means that we have to “step back”” from what is seen into the seeing of what is seen (Bortoft 2012, p. 17).  
 現象学は、われわれの足下から地面を取り去るように思われる。しかも、その際、同時に、われわれがその時まで常に
あった存在の感覚をわれわれに与えながら、そうする、・・・ただし、今や、その感覚をあたかもまるで初めて気づきで
もしたかのようにそうするのだ。現象学をしっかりと掴むのは難しい、というのは、それは、あたかも、或る起こりつつ
ある物事を、われわれがそれを掴まえることが出来る前に、既に過ぎ去ってしまっているのに、捉えようとするのに似て
いるからだ。たぶん、最も簡潔には、われわれが既に居るところへと「（ぴょんと）跳び下がる」こととして、記述でき
るだろう。このことは、＜経験の中に在る＞注意の焦点を、その経験の中に移すことを意味する。それゆえ、この事は、
たとえば、見ることを考察しているならば、われわれは、見られている「事」から「跳び下がって」、見られている事を
「見ること」の中へと、入って行かなければならないことを意味する。 
 
12. Phenomenology recovers the order of truth as residing in things. It is not hidden, it does not lie under or behind or beneath things, 
and hence does not require Depth Theory to winkle it out. It is what is manifest (what shows) in things and how. If this is very obvious 
(as it must be) it yet requires a particular way of seeing and understanding in order to grasp it, for it can simply be no-seen at all (Scan-
nell 1996, p. 169). 
現象学は、物事の中に住むものとしての真理の秩序を取り戻す。それ[真理の秩序]は隠れて居るのではない。それは、も
ろもろの物事の、下に、あるいは後ろに、あるいは直ぐ下に、横たわっては居ない。それゆえ、それを抓みだすのに深層
理論を必要とはしない。それは、もろもろの物事の中に露わになっている（露わにされている）事であり、また、露わに
なる「仕方」である。もしこのことが分かり切ったことであるとしても、（そしてそうであるに＜違いない＞のだが）、
それを掴むためには、或る特定の見方と理解の仕方を要するのである。というのは、それは、簡単に見ることが可能では
全く無いからだ。 
 
13. Phenomenology: The disciplined struggle “to let be,” to let being appear or break through (Buckley 1971, p. 199). 
  現象学：「在らしめる（to let be）」、存在を現れさせる、あるいは、[隠れた状態の隙間から]姿を現わさせる、訓
練された闘い。 
 
14．Phenomenology: The gathering together of what already belongs together even while apart (Mugerauer 1988, p. 216). 
現象学 お互いに離れている場合でさえも、（実は）既に一緒である（＝共属する）ものごとを、集めて一緒にすること。 
 
 
 
 
31
Environmental & Architectural Phenomenology, Vol. 31 [], No.
ISSN: 1083-9194
 32 
 
 
15. Phenomenology: To let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself (Heidegger 
1962, p. 58). 
＊ 現象学。おのれを示す当のものを、そのものがおのれ自身のほうから示すとおりに、おのれ自身のほうから見させる
ということ（にほかならない）。（『ハイデガー』（「存在と時間」）原祐・渡辺二郎訳、世界の名著74、中央公論社、
ｐ.111） 
 
16. [Phenomenology] adopts no standpoint and provides no single direction of approach. [It] informs us simply that something we 
experience is to be disclosed, and this in turn means that it must somehow be hidden from us, though it may be superficially familiar. 
Phenomenology thus reveals itself as a gentle, responsive way of thinking. It tends to become what it studies. It is the method of im-
posing no method (Relph, 1983. p. 201). 
（現象学は）立場を採らず、唯の一つの接近の指示の提供さえもしない。（現象学は）われわれが経験している或る事が
露わにされるべきだということを、われわれに、単に、告げ知らせるのだ。そして、そのことが次に意味するのは、それ
[経験されている或る事]は、表面的にはよく親しまれているかも知れないが、[実は] 何らかの仕方でわれわれから隠さ
れているに違いないということ、である。現象学は、したがって、穏やかで物わかりのよい或る思考方法として、その姿
を露わに示す。現象学は、自らが研究する物事に成る傾向がある。現象学は、[何らかの決まった]方法を押し付けること
をしない方法である。 
 
17. Phenomenology invites us to stay with “the experience itself, ” to concentrate on its character and structure rather than whatever it 
is that might underlie or be causally responsible for it…..[Phenomenology] facilitates a return to experience, to awaken in us a sense 
of its importance by demonstrating the founding role of experience in our conception of the world, however sophisticated that concep-
tion has become through the advancement of the natural sciences. In striving to awaken us to our own experience, to the phenomena 
through which our conceptions of the world is constituted, phenomenology seeks to awaken us to ourselves, to make us alive to our 
existence as subjects who bear a kind of ultimate responsibility for that conception (Cerbone 2016, p. 3). 
現象学は、われわれを巻き込んで「経験そのもの」と共に留まらせようとする。つまり、［現象学は］ひょっとしたらそ
の経験の基礎と成っているかも知れないこと、あるいは、経験に対して因果的に責めを負っているかも知れないことによ
りも、むしろ、その経験の性格と構造に集中させる。・・・[現象学は]経験への帰還を促進し、われわれの世界概念にお
いて、われわれの経験が果たす基礎づけの役割を明示することで、経験のもつ重要性の或る感覚をわれわれの中に目覚め
させる。その場合、もろもろの自然科学の進歩を通して、その世界概念が如何に洗練されたものになって来ているとして
も、そのことに惑わされずに[そうするの]である。現象学は、われわれを、われわれ自身の経験に対して目覚めさせよう
と努める中で、つまり、もろもろの現象を通してわれわれの世界概念は構成されたのだが、その諸現象に対して目覚めさ
せようと［一方では］努める。［その努力の中で、他方では、現象学は、］われわれを、われわれ自身について目覚めさ
せようと努める。つまり、あの世界概念の構成に対して一種の究極的な責任を負っている主体としてのわれわれの実存［
生き方と在り方］に、われわれ自身を気づかせよう（目覚めさせよう）と努める。 
 
18. [Phenomenology entails] letting things become manifest as what they are, without forcing our own categories on them… [T]he 
very essence of true understanding is that of being led by the power of the thing to manifest itself…. Phenomenology is a means of 
being led by the phenomenon through a way of access genuinely belonging to it…. Such a method … is not grounded in human con-
sciousness and human categories but in the manifestness of the thing encountered, the reality that comes to meet us (Palmer 1969, p. 
128). 
（現象学は必然的に以下のことを伴う、すなわち）、もろもろの物事に、それらがそれで在るところのものとして明示的
となるに任せること。しかも、それは、それらの物事にわれわれ自身の範疇（カテゴリー）を押し付けることをしないで
、そうすること。真の理解の本質そのものは、その物事の力によって、その物事自体を明らかにさせるようにさせること
である。・・・現象学は、その現象に真に属している或る接近の道を通して、導かれる方法である。そのような方法は、
・・・人間の意識とか人間の範疇とかに基づいているのではなくて、出会われた物事の、われわれに会いにやってくる現
実の、明示性に基づいているのである。 
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19. Phenomenology is the study of essences; and according to it, all problems amount to finding definitions of essences: the essence of 
perceptions, or the essence of consciousness, for example. But phenomenology is also a philosophy that puts essences back into exist-
ence and does not expect to arrive at an understanding of [human beings] and the world from any standing point other than that of 
their “facticity” (Merleau-Ponty 1962. p. vii).  
＊ 現象学とは本質（essences）の研究であって、一切の問題は、現象学によれば、けっきょくは本質を定義すること
に帰着する。たとえば、知覚の本質とか、意識の本質とか、といった具合である。ところが現象学とは、また同時に、本
質を存在（existence）へとつれ戻す哲学でもあり、人間と世界とはその＜事実性＞ (“facticity”) から出発するのでなけ
れば了解できないものだ、と考える哲学でもある。（Ｍ．メルロー＝ポンティ、『知覚の現象学 １』竹内芳郎・小木貞
孝訳、1967、ｐ. 1 序文の冒頭） 
 
20. Many aspects of Husserl’s formulation of phenomenology endure as central themes, including his catch cry “back to the things 
themselves” (Zu den Sachen selbst), which expressed the idea of the avoidance of metaphysical speculation, the attempt to gain a pre-
suppositionless starting point, the use of description rather than causal explanation, and the attempt to gain insight into the essences of 
all kinds of phenomena (Moran 2001, p. 353).  
 フッサールが定式化した現象学の多くの見方は、中心的な主題として、時の試練に耐えるものである。その中には、彼
の呼び込み言葉「物事そのものへ還れ」（事柄そのものへ！）が含まれる。この言葉が表現しているのは、形而上学的な
思弁の回避、前提予見を置かない一つの出発点を確保しようとする試み、因果的説明ではなくて叙述（記述）を用いるこ
と、そして、あらゆる種類の諸現象の本質への洞察を得ようとする試み、などの理念である。 
 
21. Phenomenology: The excavation of human experience, first, in terms of particular persons and groups in particular places, situa-
tions, and historical moments; and, second, as this excavation engenders a self-conscious effort to make intellectual and emotional 
sense of what that experience reveals in terms of broader lived structures and more ethical ways of being, willing and acting (Seamon 
2008, p. 15).  
 現象学：人間経験の発掘。第一に、特定の人物たちの、もろもろの集団の、―――特定のもろもろの場所、もろもろの
状況、および、もろもろの歴史的時間、などにおける、―――人間経験の発掘[である]。そして、第二に、この発掘が或
る自己意識的な努力を生み、その経験がより広い生きられた構造との関連で、また、存在、意志および行為の、より倫理
的な在り方との関連で、その経験が何を露わにするかということの、知性的および情動的な意味を分かろうとする発掘、
[そのような] 人間経験の発掘である。 
 
22. Our relation to the world is so fundamental, so obvious and natural, that we normally do not reflect upon it. It is this domain of 
ignored obviousness that phenomenology seeks to investigate. The task of phenomenology is not to obtain new empirical knowledge 
about different areas in the world, but rather to comprehend the basic relation in the world that is supposed by any such empirical in-
vestigation…. The world is, as Merleau-Ponty writes, wonderful. It is a gift and a riddle. But in order to realize this, it is necessary to 
suspend our ordinary blind and thoughtless taking the world for granted (Zahavi 2019, p. 67). 
 世界に対する、われわれの関係は、あまりに根本的で、あまりに当たり前で、自然である。そのため、われわれは、普
通は、それについて反省することがない。この等閑（ないがしろ）にされた当たり前さの領域こそが、現象学が研究しよ
うと努める領域である。現象学の課題は、この世界における様々な分野についての新たな経験的知識を獲得することでは
ない。そうではなくて、むしろ、如何なるそのような経験的研究によっても想定されてしまっている、この世界における
基本的な（我々と世界との）関係を把握することである。・・・世界は、メルロー＝ポンティが書いているように、驚き
に満ちている。それは、贈り物であり謎である。しかし、このことを悟るには、世界を当たり前だとしてしまう、われわ
れの通常の盲目さと考えの無さとを、留保することが必要である。 
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23. [The aim is] making evident an essential distinction among the possible ways in which the pregiven world, the ontic universe 
[das ontische Universum], can become thematic for us. Calling to mind what has repeatedly been said: the lifeworld, for us who 
wakingly live in it, is always already there, existing in advance for us, the “ground” of all praxis whether theoretical or extra-theoret-
ical. The world is pregiven to us, the waking, always somehow practically interested subjects, not occasionally but always and nec-
essarily as the universal field of all actual and possible praxis, as horizon. To live is always to live-in-certainty-of-the-world. Waking 
life is being awake to the world, being constantly and directly “conscious” of the world and of oneself as living in the world, actually 
experiencing [erleben] and actually effecting the ontic certainty of the world. 
The world is pregiven thereby, in every case, in such a way that individual things are given. But there exists a fundamental dif-
ference between the way we are conscious of the world and the way we are conscious of things or objects (taken in the broadest 
sense, but still purely in the sense of the lifeworld), though together the two make up an inseparable unity. Things, objects (always 
understood purely in the sense of the lifeworld) are “given” as being valid for us in every case (in some mode or other of ontic cer-
tainty) but in principle only in such a way that we are conscious of them as things or objects within the world-horizon. Each one is 
something, “something of” the world of which we are constantly conscious as a horizon. 
On the other hand, we are conscious of this horizon only as a horizon for existing objects; without particular objects of con-
sciousness, it cannot be actual [aktuell]. Every object has its possible varying modes of being valid, the modalizations of ontic cer-
tainty. The world, on the other hand, does not exist as an entity, as an object, but exists within such uniqueness that the plural makes 
no sense when applied to it. Every plural, and every singular drawn from it, presupposes the world-horizon. This difference between 
the manner of being of an object in the world and that of the world itself obviously prescribes fundamentally different correlative 
types of consciousness for them (Husserl 1970, pp. 142–143).  
＊ [その目的は、]このあらかじめ与えられてある世界存在者の総体が、われわれにとって主題になりうるさまざまの可
能な様式の本質的区別を明証的にすることである。繰り返し述べてきたことを思い起こすならば、生活世界は、その世界
の中に目ざめつつ生きているわれわれにとって、いつもすでにそこにあり、あらかじめわれわれにとって存在し、理論的
であれ理論以外であれ、すべての実践のための「基盤」となる。世界は、目ざめつつつねに何らかの仕方で実践的な関心
をいだいている主体としてのわれわれに、たまたまあるときに与えられるというものではなく、あらゆる現実的および可
能的実践の普遍的領野として、地平として、あらかじめ与えられている。生とは、たえず、＜世界確信の中に生きる＞と
いうことである。＜目ざめて生きている＞とは世界に対して目ざめているということであり、絶えず現実的に、世界とそ
の世界の中に生きている自分自身とを「意識している」ということであり、世界の存在確実性を真に体験し、現に進行し
ているということである。 
   そのさい世界は、その時どき個々の事物が与えられているその与えられ方の中で、いつもあらかじめ与えられてい
る。しかし、世界意識と事物意識（最も広義の、しかし、純粋に生活世界的意味においての）とのあいだにはその意識の
仕方において、原理的な区別が存する。もっとも他方では、この両者は分かちがたい統一をなしてもいるのだが、事物や
対象（つねに純粋に生活世界的意味に解された）は、われわれにとって、そのつど（存在確実性の何らかの様相において
）妥当するものとして「与えられて」いるが、しかしそれらは原理的に物として、つまり世界地平のうちにある対象とし
て意識されるという仕方でのみ、「与えられて」いるのである。それぞれの事物は何ものかであるが、それはわれわれに
たえず地平として意識されている世界「に属する何ものか」なのである。 
   他方この地平は、存在する対象に対する地平としてのみ意識されており、特に意識された対象なしには現実的に存
在しえない。それぞれの事物は、それぞれの妥当の可能的変移相、つまり存在確実性の様相化の可能的変移相をもつ。他
方、世界は、一個の存在者、一個の対象のように存在するのではなく、唯一性において、すなわちそれに対しては複数が
無意味であるような唯一性において、存在する。あらゆる複数とそこから取り出される単数とは、世界地平を前提にして
いるのだ。この世界の中の対象と世界そのものとの在り方の差異が、この両者にそれに応じた根本的に異なる意識のされ
方を指定することになる。（Ｅフッサール、1974年 『ヨーロッパ諸学の危機と超越論的現象学』細谷恒夫・木田元 
訳、中央公論社、199-200） 
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Postscript [English translation follows] 
Akihiro Yoshida 
あとがき 日本の読者に   吉田章宏 
 
 ここに掲載する＜定義リスト＞「現象学の定義２３」（英語原文と邦訳）は、その蒐集編集者であるDavid Seamon教
授のご好意により、吉田章宏が邦訳し、広く日本の読者の自由で開かれた活用に提供することが許されたものです。現象
学を、多種多様な人間科学研究において活用を志す研究者と実践者、また、そのような活用による研究と実践の理解を望
む研究者と実践者にとって、そもそも「現象学とは何か？」という理解は重要です。しかし、その理解は、実は、多種多
様でありうることが、ここに明瞭に示されています。この多種多様性は、一方では、現象学の多面性が、他方では、現象
学の開放性が、示されています。もちろん、この情況を、混乱を生む混沌と見るか、発展を導く豊饒と見るか、肯定する
か否定するか、批判し排除するか、総ての統合を希求するか、その見方もまた多種多様でしょう。この情況は、歴史的に
、現象学の発展の初期においても見られたようです。そして、さらに、他の諸学問においても、例えば、数学においてさ
え、見られる事情なのです。そこで、その事情と情況をめぐる自由な議論自体もまた、現象学の発展を希求する実践者と
研究者にとって、また、多視点性を重視する現象学の深化と発展にとって、有益であることが期待されます。現象学研究
者の方々には、それぞれの定義執筆者の世界を豊かに生き生きと想像することにより、また、それぞれの原著者の世界に
赴き、原著作を探究することにより、ご自身の現象学の世界を豊饒化する手掛かりとする可能性も、開かれています。ま
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た、「定義２３」は、現象学の教育における、生きた教材とすることもできましょう。David Seamon教授により提供され
たこの「定義２３」が、現象学に関心を抱く皆さまのご参考となり、それぞれの実践と研究と教育に示唆するところがあ
り、一方で、深化と厳密化を、他方で、自由化と解放化を、共にもたらすことを願います。そしてこの「日本語版」も、
そのような発展の一契機となることを、邦訳者として、心から希望いたします。そして、さらに、いつの日か、日本にお
ける現象学的な研究者と実践者の方々による「定義」への挑戦も、夢見ます。 
2019年秋、 邦訳者 吉田章宏 東京大学名誉教授、Ph.D. 
 
Postscript Translation 
 
Akihiro Yoshida 
 
The EAP entry, “23 definitions of phenomenology,” has been generously 
permitted, by the original compiler David Seamon, to be republished here, 
including the original English phrasings and their Japanese translations. I 
translated these definitions from English into Japanese; they are offered 
here to all Japanese readers, including researchers and students, for their 
free and open use. Whether to study and use phenomenology as a method or 
to live and love phenomenology as a life, the understanding of the question 
“What is phenomenology?” is vitally important. 
      This understanding, however, is multi-perspectively varied, as is to be 
observed in the range of meaning offered by the “23 definitions of phenom-
enology.” This multiple variety can be understood as expressing the diver-
sity of phenomenology, on one hand, and the wealth of phenomenology as a 
whole, on the other. Naturally, this situation could also be understood multi-
perspectively as, for example: (1) to be negatively criticized vs. to be posi-
tively approved; (2) To be worried about as a confusing chaos vs. to be wel-
comed as an enriching diversification; (3) to be integrated to include all in 
one family, vs. to be discriminatively determined either to be welcomed or 
to be ostracized for maintaining the purity of phenomenology, and so on. 
Here again, the views will be multi-perspectively varied. 
This situation, however, is not particularly characteristic of current 
phenomenology, which is used in many disciplines, even mathematics. 
Thus, the free and open discussions, and even heated debates, on the prob-
lematic situations themselves hopefully could make a positive contribution 
for the development, in depth and width, of phenomenology. After all, does 
not phenomenology, with its use of free imaginative variation—one of its 
major original methods—intrinsically treasure multi-perspectivity? Practi-
tioners of phenomenology, to enrich their own lived-worlds, 
might/could/would/should vividly imagine the tacit implications of each of 
the 23 definitions for their own lived worlds. These practitioners might ini-
tiate active explorations into the works and worlds of the respective writers. 
Thus, the “23 definitions” could be adopted as living instructional ma-
terial in the educational practices of phenomenology. Hopefully, these “23 
definitions” might help advance phenomenological research in both ways—
to strengthen rigor, on the one hand, and to liberate openness and fruitful 
diversity, on the other. 
As translator of this “Japanese version,” I sincerely hope that my trans-
lation might contribute in its own way to further the development of phe-
nomenology both in Japan and in the world. And, I cannot help but dream 
of a similar set of “definitions” offered someday by Japanese phenomeno-
logical researchers and practitioners. 
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Questions relating to environmental and architectural phenomenology (from EAP, 2014 [vol. 25, no. 3, p. 4]) 
 
Questions relating to phenomenology 
and related interpretive approaches 
and methods: 
❖ What is phenomenology and what does 
it offer to whom?  
❖ What is the state of phenomenological 
research today? What are your hopes 
and concerns regarding phenomenol-
ogy? 
❖ Does phenomenology continue to have 
relevance in examining human experi-
ence in relation to world? 
❖ Are there various conceptual and meth-
odological modes of phenomenology 
and, if so, how can they be categorized 
and described? 
❖ Has phenomenological research been 
superseded by other conceptual ap-
proaches—e.g., post-structuralism, so-
cial-constructionism, critical theory, re-
lationalist and non-representational per-
spectives, the various conceptual 
“turns,” and so forth? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to mak-
ing a better world? If so, what are the 
most crucial phenomena and topics to 
be explored phenomenologically? 
❖ Can phenomenological research offer 
practical results in terms of design, 
planning, policy, and advocacy? 
❖ How might phenomenological insights 
be broadcast in non-typical academic 
ways—e.g., through artistic expression, 
theatrical presentation, digital evoca-
tion, virtual realities, and so forth? 
❖ What are the most important aims for 
future phenomenological research? 
❖ Do the various post-structural and so-
cial-constructionist criticisms of phe-
nomenology—that it is essentialist, 
masculinist, authoritative, voluntarist, 
ignorant of power structures, and so 
forth—point toward its demise? 
 
Questions relating to the natural 
world and environmental and ecologi-
cal concerns: 
❖ Can there be a phenomenology of na-
ture and the natural world? 
❖ What can phenomenology offer the in-
tensifying environmental and ecological 
crises we face today? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to more 
sustainable actions and worlds? 
❖ Can one speak of a sustainable life-
world? 
❖ What is a phenomenology of a lived en-
vironmental ethic and who are the key 
contributors? 
❖ Do the “sacred” and the “holy” have a 
role in caring for the natural world? For 
places? For lifeworlds broadly? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to envi-
ronmental education? If so, in what 
ways? 
❖ Can there be a phenomenology of the 
two laws of thermodynamics, especially 
the second law claiming that all activi-
ties, left to their own devices, tend to-
ward greater disorder and fewer possi-
bilities? Are there ways whereby phe-
nomenological understanding of life-
world might help to reduce the acceler-
ating disordering of natural and human 
worlds? 
 
Questions relating to place, place ex-
perience, and place meaning: 
❖ Why has the theme of place become an 
important phenomenological topic? 
❖ Can a phenomenological understanding 
of place contribute to better place mak-
ing? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to a 
generative understanding of place and 
place making? 
❖ What roles do bodily regularity and ha-
bitual inertia play in the constitution of 
place and place experience? 
❖ What are the lived relationships be-
tween place, sustainability, and a re-
sponsive environmental ethic? 
❖ How are phenomenological accounts to 
respond to post-structural interpreta-
tions of space and place as rhizomic and 
a “meshwork of paths” (Ingold)? 
❖ Can phenomenological accounts incor-
porate a “progressive sense of place” 
argued for by critical theorists like 
Doreen Massey? 
❖ Can phenomenological explications of 
space and place account for human dif-
ferences—gender, sexuality, less-
abledness, social class, cultural back-
ground, and so forth? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to the 
politics and ideology of place? 
❖ Can a phenomenological understanding 
of lived embodiment and habitual iner-
tia be drawn upon to facilitate robust 
places and to generate mutual support 
and awareness among places, especially 
places that are considerably different 
(e.g., different ethnic neighborhoods or 
regions)? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to mo-
bility, the nature of “flows,” rhizomic 
spaces, the places of mobility, non-
spaces and their relationship to mobility 
and movement? 
 
Questions relating to architecture and 
environmental design and policy: 
❖ Can there be a phenomenology of archi-
tecture and architectural experience and 
meaning? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to bet-
ter architectural design? 
❖ How do qualities of the designable 
world—spatiality, materiality, lived 
aesthetics, environmental embodiment 
etc.—contribute to lifeworlds? 
❖ What are the most pertinent environ-
mental and architectural features con-
tributing to a lifeworld’s being one way 
rather than another? 
❖ What role will cyberspace and digital 
technologies have in 21st-century life-
worlds? How will they play a role in 
shaping designed environments, partic-
ularly architecture? 
❖ What impact will digital advances and 
virtual realities have on physical em-
bodiment, architectural design, and 
real-world places? Will virtual reality 
eventually be able to simulate “real re-
ality” entirely? If so, how does such a 
development transform the nature of 
lifeworld, natural attitude, place, and ar-
chitecture? 
❖ Can virtual worlds become so “real” 
that they are lived as “real” worlds? 
 
Other potential questions: 
❖ What is the lived relationship between 
people and the worlds in which they 
find themselves? 
❖ Can lifeworlds be made to happen self-
consciously? If so, how? Through what 
individual efforts? Through what group 
efforts? 
❖ Can a phenomenological education in 
lifeworld, place, and environmental em-
bodiment assist citizens and profession-
als in better understanding the workings 
and needs of real-world places and 
thereby contribute to their envisioning 
and making? 
❖ Is it possible to speak of human-rights-
in-place or place justice? If so, would 
such a possibility move attention and 
supportive efforts toward improving the 
places in which people and other living 
beings find themselves, rather than fo-
cusing only on the rights and needs of 
individuals and groups without consid-
eration of their place context? 
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Environmental & Architectural 
Phenomenology 
 
Published digitally twice a year, EAP is a forum and clearing house 
for research and design that incorporate a qualitative approach to 
environmental and architectural experience, actions, and mean-
ings. 
 
One key concern of EAP is design, education, policy, and advocacy 
supporting and strengthening natural and built places that sustain 
human and environmental wellbeing. Realizing that a clear con-
ceptual stance is integral to informed research and design, the edi-
tor emphasizes phenomenological approaches but also gives atten-
tion to related styles of qualitative research. EAP welcomes essays, 
letters, reviews, conference information, and so forth. Forward sub-
missions to the editor. 
 
Editor 
Dr. David Seamon, 
Architecture Department 
1088 Seaton Hall, 920 17th Street 
Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS 66506-2901 USA 
tel: 785-532-5953; triad@ksu.edu 
 
Exemplary Themes 
▪ The nature of environmental and architectural experience; 
▪ Sense of place, including place identity and place attachment; 
▪ Architectural and landscape meaning; 
▪ The environmental, architectural, spatial, and material dimen-
sions of lifeworlds; 
▪ Changing conceptions of space, place, and nature; 
▪ Home, dwelling, journey, and mobility; 
▪ Environmental encounter and its relation to environmental re-
sponsibility and action; 
▪ Environmental and architectural atmospheres and ambiences; 
▪ Environmental design as place making; 
▪ Sacred space, landscape, and architecture; 
▪ The role of everyday things—furnishings, tools, clothing, in-
terior design, landscape features, and so forth—in supporting 
people’s sense of environmental wellbeing; 
▪ The progressive impact of virtual reality on human life and 
how it might transform the lived nature of “real” places, build-
ings, and lifeworlds; 
▪ The practice of a lived environmental ethic. 
 
For additional themes and topics, see the preceding page, which 
outlines a series of relevant questions originally published in the 
25th-anniversary issue of EAP in 2014 (vol. 25, no. 3, p. 4). 
 
Beginning in 2016, EAP is digitally open-source only. Current and 
back digital issues of EAP are available at the following digital ad-
dresses: 
 
https://ksu.academia.edu/DavidSeamon 
http://newprairiepress.org/eap/ 
http://krex.k-state.edu/dspace/handle/2097/1522 (archive cop-
ies) 
 
Readers who wish to receive an email notice when a new issue is 
electronically available, should send an email to the editor with 
that request. Though EAP is now digital, we still have production 
costs and welcome reader donations.  
 
Because EAP is now only digital, we have discontinued all library 
subscriptions. Libraries that wish to remain subscribed should link 
their digital catalogue to the archival digital address provided 
above. A limited number of back issues of EAP, in hard copy, 
1990–2015, are available for $10/volume (3 issues/volume). Con-
tact the editor for details. 
 
Copyright Notice 
All contents of EAP, including essays by contributors, are protected 
by copyright and/or related rights. Individual contributors retain 
copyright to their essays and accompanying materials. Interested 
parties should contact contributors for permission to reproduce or 
draw from their work. 
 
Open Access Policy 
EAP provides immediate access to its content on the principle that 
making research freely available to the public supports a greater 
global exchange of knowledge. 
 
Archival Policy 
 EAP is archived for perpetual access through the participation of 
Kansas State University’s New Prairie Press in CLOCKSS (“Con-
trolled Lots of Copies Keep Stuff Safe”) and Portico, managed 
through the Digital Commons Publishing platform. New Prairie 
Press also participates in LOCKSS (Lots of Copies Keep Stuff 
Safe). Once published, an issue’s contents are never changed. Ar-
chival copies of EAP   are also available at Kansas State Univer-
sity’s digital archive, K-Rex (see links above). 
 
Note: All entries for which no author is given are by the EAP Edi-
tor.
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